

SECRET

István ADORJÁN

**GLOBAL
CIVIL
MARITIME
NAVIGATION
INTERACTING WITH
NATIONAL
ARMED
FORCES
OF STATES**

GLOBALIST PUBLICATIONS

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I, the author of this book, do regularly not restrain my research to a single branch of science, but extend it to a number of disciplines necessary for approaching, investigating and penetrating as comprehensively and profoundly as possible the topics which i have selected on the basis of national secret political inconveniency, measure of taboo character, and cognitive necessity. Therefore, both my books and person have been considered as being illegitimate from the point of view of the secret laws of the secret societies termed by me “ethnic or national secret political organizations”, as being out of their desired absolute secret control, as being politically inconvenient for their existence and actions. They have been the first readers of my books in implementing their national secret policy of controlling, shaping, conserving and utilizing the ethnic groups, nations, national states and the great religions, as well as have not been interested in the existence and action of such a kind of scientific posture and social status, which can be termed “multi-pioneer”. They have become accustomed to an ultra-specialized kind of scientist, being active only in a single branch of science, engaged by an institution at least partly funded by the state, preoccupied with gathering titles and keeping up an ever rising professional career and prestige, and with that the higher they get with their titles, positions, career and prestige, the more they take into account in their scientific research the interests of the political establishment, which are ultimately and for the most part the ethnic and the national secret political organizations, by so doing becoming stronger and stronger supporting-pillars of the prevailing political circumstances of the general civil human activity. In this way, in striving to improve their financial condition, to continue and get promotions in their positions, and advance in their career and prestige, they are neither interested, nor stimulated in openly dealing with politically inconvenient topics. After having been direct or indirect means of politicians in creating scientific contents for means of supporting their policies, they are also prone and suitable to be utilized with the secret civil and state power of the ethnic and the national secret political organizations in combating my books and person considered illegitimate and inconvenient, with plagiary state show trials or with plagiary civil processes without plagiary state show trials, as means of usurping everything relatively valuable that is not evidently of my person, of transferring into the property of “nation” the copyright relative to my books, of nationalizing them, based on tricks as sham evidences, by having my books, person and activity paralleled, discredited and with the usurped-nationalized copyright finally having my person and activity repressed and concealed, my books withdrawn from free circulation, and at most replaced with their “national” contential conco-

tions asserted by their “national” personal concoctions of scientists or politicians in their “national” institutional concoctions, and in this way by depriving the potential readers of the accessibility to these knowledge and evidences relative to the existence and actions of the ethnical and the national secret political organizations, as well as potential history-molding factors contrary to their “national” interests. According to their preparing programing, they intend to utilize three major methods of conducting plagiarism state show trials or plagiarism civil processes against my books and person: 1) The method of creaming off, planned for combating one book or my person by secretly usurping new scientific and/or political ideas, and openly having them asserted: they sort out one or more new scientific and/or political ideas of my target book or of the contents of my quasi-daily verbal communications with them through the espionage bugs built in the walls or elsewhere in my rooms, they select one or more scientists, politicians or other kind of persons, possibly with whom my personal relations are for them possible and desirable, in order not to recognize me as appearing as their inspirer, but present me as their nodder and follower, they present them the respective ideas, commission them to publish or implement those in a form or other, preferably through television, radio or internet, and they possibly also commission one or more of them to assert their alleged priority and intellectual prejudice by implicating repressive organs of state against my person on their attacking my respective book, or my publishing the target ideas. 2) The method of paralleling, planned for combating one book in its entirety: they select the most suitable scientist for a parallel person, possibly with whom my personal relation is for them possible and desirable, for a parallel activity they present him or her my book, commission him or her to reconstruct and acquire my research, to do some extra work in order to “get ahead of and become better than me”, then from his or her this new theoretical position to present himself or herself as having priority and being the source of my book, possibly also by accusing me with the plagiarism which he or she has committed against my book and person, in exchange for promotion in position and advancement in career, growing in prosperity and prestige, and by utilizing the repressive function of the state to legally deprive me of the intellectual property and control over the plagiarized knowledge and cognition, morally and legally punish my person with discredit, fine or imprisonment, and to annihilate and eliminate my respective book from free circulation. 3) The method of essence or key, planned for combating one or several books at a time, with minimum effort and indirect plagiarism: starting from my selected book or books, they have it conceived or concocted the “essence” or the “key”, of which they are to pretend that it constitutes the theoretical origin of my selected book or books, they present it to the selected scientist or non-scientist, commission him or her to publish it in a form or other — in spite of the fact that publishing of “essence” or “key” does not normally happen, and books do not normally result from an “essence” or a “key” — then to present his or her “essence” or “key” as the origin of my selected book or books, and so on, like in the method of paralleling. Therefore, i consider it as being a personal secret political attack, a national criminal act, and a national plagiarism state show trial, or a national plagiarism civil process against science, scientific cognition, the free streaming of information, civil society, democracy, my person, and potentially other humans secretly considered politically inconvenient, executed in the cover of members of some organs of national states and/or members of the civil society performing parallel activities, as parallel persons and national criminals, as well as a further evidence relative to the existence and actions of the ethnical and the national secret political organizations, any state trial conducted against my books and person, or any other civil process carried out without public regard to them, without evidences beyond any shadow of doubt, and/or with sham evidences.

Language information

The language of this book is not quite the english proper. There are many languages on Terra that are potentially universal in that everyone may acquire and use them without a significant change in quality of life. There is a wide civil need for a unique real universal language in order to enable humans to communicate with one another. The Roman Empire was not sufficient for carrying into effect the universality of the latin language. A national state shall not be capable of carrying into effect the universality of its language ever. At present, the english proper is the nearest to the quality of unique real universal language. However, as a natural language it has many deficiencies, and it might not be the best means of universal communication. And as rules in a language are made not by states, but by its users in thinking, speaking and writing, with writing his books in the english language the author makes a few steps towards turning the english proper into the unique real universal language on Terra, as an intermediary phase towards breaking down all artificial frontiers among humans and peoples in the Terra nation and Terra state.

This book was meant to reveal political aspects and connexions of the maritime industry, which cannot regularly be expected to be enunciated by institutional scientists, as their secret reason to exist have been to strengthen and not to weaken national states, on which their living, positions, career and prestige have depended, and the serving of the interests of which they have not been able to avoid.

The maritime industry is the economic domain which national states control and care for in the least measure: it acts outside of national territory, draws national humans out of the motherland, employs non-national humans, neglects national language by using the english, and last but not least it is regulated by international law. It is a place of conflict between national and international interests and policies, between the conservatism of national or ethnical states and the progressivism of a United States of Terra in the course of formation.

*The national secret political organizations
define, design, defend, promote and make their own versions of nations and states.*

*According to the definition of the russian national secret political organization,
the ukrainian nation and state are parts of the russian nation and respectively state.*

*In making its version of russian nation and state,
it had Ukraine being invaded and degraded with its armed forces,
to implement its concoction that the ukrainian nation and state do not exist.*

*Demand the human right
for defining, designing, defending, promoting and making the nations and the states.*

*Demand the expansion of democracy
from the right of electing the governments
to the right of choosing also the borders of the states.*

*Then the ukrainian and the russian humans will be able
to define their own nations or sub-nations, and make their own states or sub-states,
and so they will eliminate the ability of even one new potential russian national state
to incorporate and assimilate even one new potential ukrainian subnational sub-state.*

*National land armies, aerial forces, and navies
have primarily been the military means of the most aggressive national states
in achieving their national-imperialist illegitimate political purposes,
thus they having threatened or broken national and international peace and security,
caused immeasurable destruction, and sent to death innumerable humans,
and so made national human societies turn against their own reason of existence.*

*Since 2022, the national secret political organizations
have been using the militaristic, terroristic, barbaric, and imperialistic instincts
of the russian national-imperialist state, as the most aggressive national state at present,
to globally increase the importance of the armed forces of national states,
and decrease the importance and repress the will of the civil forces of global society,
in order to counter the new world order based on the human right for state making.*

Demand a global convention of substantial disarming of national states!

*Demand the global reduction of national armed forces
to coast and air guards, as well as police!*

Demand the institution of an ocean guard and a security police of the United Nations!

So there will be global peace and security.

Maritime exclusion zones are principally a tool for the management of merchant shipping. [1]

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OF STATES**

Scientific research

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Foreword

With this book, i research and reveal the relatively hidden and concealed interaction between the civil navies and the armed forces of states, from the point of view of the civil navigator, both in times of peace and in times of war. As a result of my experiences and findings, i can presume that this research topic has been considered inconvenient by the secret societies termed by me “ethnical or national secret political organizations” controlling the states in a measure, because of its providing information and reasons for civil societies for reducing the armed forces as one of their most valuable political means of conserving and enhancing the national-imperialist reign of their national states, and accordingly this topic has been strangled in secret, as well as self-strangled by higher professionals, who have been aware of the corresponding national secret political requirement or expectation, and have not wanted their positions, career and prestige to be impaired.

On the basis of common experience, it can be presumed that the military navy influences maritime transportation in a much greater measure than the land and aerial armed forces of states influence land and respectively aerial transportation. This is owing to mainly the predominantly natural character and relatively great accessibility of the maritime communications routes, the vast areas of seas and oceans, the vacuum of authority in the Planetary Ocean, and not in the least to the relatively low speed of the maritime transportation. Owing to this influence and the importance of the safety and security of maritime transportation, there is a considerable amount of data available about state military maritime zones in the Sailing Directions, which otherwise would have presumably been state military secrets at least partly.

The armed forces of national states are specialized in destruction and mass destruction, killing and mass killing. On land, humans can hardly see tanks or other armored vehicles, they are concealed in storage facilities; in air, fighter jets fly too high and loud in order not to be seen and heard at times; at sea, the lower airspace is too open and the water surface is too clear and smooth in order for the military vessels not to be observed through the binoculars of lookouts on merchant vessels navigating miles away, but the number of lookouts is too small for the military vessels to hide. The military vessels of the greatest “nations” can be seen even around the middle of the oceans, namely far inside the high seas, the international waters. As they have not managed to grasp “sovereignty and sovereign rights” [2] there, they have concocted special, international “national interests”, which they pretend to “protect and guarantee with naval activity in the world’s oceans”, [3] such as the russian military navy, which under the pretext of visiting its “friendly” [4] cuban military navy, and carrying on the tradition of the soviet military navy, has made a “standard practice” [4] of traversing the Atlantic Ocean and approaching the “enemy” [5] country of USA, last time in june 2024, when it also conducted a drill in breaking the Articles 88, and possibly 58 as well, of UNCLOS with its “reserving the high seas and the exclusive economic zones for the peaceful purpose” [2] of “firing high-precision missiles at mock enemy targets from a distance of more than 600km”, [6] as a kind of historical-psychological satisfaction of the russian national secret political organization to the failure of 1962 of its Russian Empire or Communist Russian Federation termed “Soviet Union” to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, by so doing parading its newest Zirkon hypersonic nuclear missiles, as one of the most barbaric and anti-civilizational military concoctions of the russian “national genius” or “nation”, as well as military means of the russian national militarism, barbarism and imperialism, which allegedly cannot be intercepted by the existent anti-missile systems, [4, 5, 6] so much the less if they are launched from the waters of Cuba. In their patriotic acts carried out far from their motherlands in the Planetary Ocean between 1945 and 1988, the military vessels — as “nations” alleged by the military national propaganda — collided at least 190 times between each other, and 184 times with civil vessels, the real ciphers having to be

greater than these ones owing to state secrecy, [7] by so doing producing destruction and killing even in peacetime.

A major characteristic of the topic of this book is that the potential of the author and other humans to modify or further develop its main sources — legal norms of states and maritime experiences and knowledge of generations of seafarers — and so to create new knowledge, is low. Under these circumstances, the main role of the author was to identify influences, general and particular types of state military maritime zones, their regulations, which all have already been created by numerous other humans, and can only be ascertained and respected. As even a most qualified and experienced navigational officer, master or commanding officer might only exceptionally discover a new type of state military maritime zone, or improve the information relative to the extant ones.

Pursuant to 33 CFR 320.1 [Note: “CFR” means “Code of Federal Regulations” of USA.] — namely Title 33, entitled “Navigation and Navigable Waters”, Part 320, entitled “General Regulatory Policies”, Section 1, entitled “Purpose and scope of the Code of Federal Regulations” — “(a) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been involved in regulating certain activities in the nation’s waters since 1890. Until 1968, the primary thrust of the Corps’ regulatory program was the protection of navigation. As a result of several new laws and judicial decisions, the program has evolved to one involving the consideration of the full public interest by balancing the favorable impacts against the detrimental impacts. This is known as the ‘public interest review’.” In the light of the “General Regulatory Policies” in the field of “Navigation and Navigable Waters” of the United States of America (USA), this book was intended to be a “civil-navigation interest review”, striving to identify both the “favorable impacts” and the “detrimental impacts” of the military navy on the civil navigation, namely just what the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers appears to have done between 1890 and 1968. Apart from the contential ones, the difference between that regulatory activity and this research is also that that was done from the point of view of the military navy, while this book intends to identify and take up position in the point of view of the civil navigation.

I prefer to use the term “military navy” instead of “navy” in order to emphasize its essential distinction from the “merchant navy”, or more generally “civil navy”: while the “military navy” is an organ of the armed forces of the national state, the “civil navy” is not an organ of state, it is an element of civil society. By the word-group “military navy”, i mean, in each case separately, the navy of a state, the navies of several states, or the navies of all the states in general.

I consider that the citations of normative texts have to be made word by word, and not paraphrased, as no individual may have the authority of modifying laws and determining their interpretations, and their full value is comprised rather by their original contents, than their interpretation and understanding by the author. The normative texts to be cited and the data, information and facts to be cited or paraphrased from other sources — in default of own data, information and experiences — are regularly intended to have a value of exemplification of previously enounced relatively general enouncements. Exemplifications by citing legal rules reflect internet accessibility, and not preference or criticism directed towards the issuing states. The term “present” refers to 2025.

1. The military influence of states on civil maritime navigation

The human society have utilized the maritime vessel — as one of the most advanced achievements of the human civilization — for both civil and military purposes. The civil maritime vessels, organized mostly in national and multinational maritime companies, regarded in their totality as part of the civil navy, represent one of the main means of the global economic development and social progress, and as such they contribute to the production of financial-budgetary resources necessary for designing, constructing and operating by states the military maritime vessels, regarded in their totality as part of the military navy, organized in national military navies, which represent political means of national states for their aggression and defense. In this context, it can be raised the problem of researching the interaction between the civil navy and the armed forces of national states, what from the point of view of the civil maritime navigation appears as the influence of the armed forces of national states on the civil navigation, the manner in which the civil navigators experience the presence and actions of the armed forces of national states on the Planetary Ocean.

In the first place as a result of the foundation of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and of its specialized institution in the civil maritime field, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), after the second world war, there were concluded a series of international conventions, applicable for the most part only to the civil navy, in conformity with its relative global and globalized character.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which applies partly to the military navy as well, with the Article 25, entitled “Rights of protection of the coastal State”, provides the right for states to establish state military maritime zones in their territorial sea: “3. The coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security, including weapons exercises. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published.” [2]

At the same time, the UNCLOS provides no right and no liberty of utilization of the exclusive economic zone and the high seas for military purposes. On the contrary, through the Articles 88 and 58 it provides that the exclusive economic zones and the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes. [2] Further, this convention excludes the “sovereignty and sovereign rights” of the states from the high seas through the Article 89: “no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.” [2]

At the same time, in conformity with its national character, in the field of the military navy up to the present there is no international convention concluded at the level of the UNO. The most advanced achievement in this direction is constituted by the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, drafted by a group of diplomats, men of law and experts in military navy and adopted in 1994 by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, which, however, although recognized internationally as a legal instrument, it is not binding. [8]

1.1. Diminution and restriction of maritime space

By unleashing an armed conflict, the belligerent military navies acquire the right — pursuant to the

customs of international law codified in the Part I, entitled General Provisions, Section IV, entitled Areas of Naval Warfare, Articles 10-12 of the San Remo Manual — to extend their “hostile actions” [9] beyond the waters being under the sovereignty of their states, to the exclusive economic zones, above the continental shelves of their states, to the high seas, as well as to the exclusive economic zones and on the continental shelves of any neutral state, under the reserve of the Article 12 that “belligerents shall have due regard for the legitimate rights and duties of those neutral States.” [9]

Pursuant to the Article 16, hostile actions are considered, among others, “attack on or capture of persons or objects, use [of neutral waters] as a base of operations, [Note: Pursuant to the Article 14, “neutral waters consist of the internal waters, territorial sea, and, where applicable, the archipelagic waters, of neutral States”.] laying of mines, visit, search, diversion or capture.” [9]

In spite of the fact that the Article 105 interdicts “establishing zones which might adversely affect the legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea,” the Article 106 admits the possibility that the belligerent military navies establish state military maritime zones, “as an exceptional measure”, [9] on condition that “(a) the same body of law applies both inside and outside the zone; (b) the extent, location and duration of the zone and the measures imposed shall not exceed what is strictly required by military necessity and the principles of proportionality; (c) due regard shall be given to the rights of neutral States to legitimate uses of the seas; (d) necessary safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft shall be provided: (i) where the geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to the ports and coasts of a neutral State; (ii) in other cases where normal navigation routes are affected, except where military requirements do not permit; and (e) the commencement, duration, location and extent of the zone, as well as the restrictions imposed, shall be publicly declared and appropriately notified.” [9]

Neither in peacetime remain the greater military navies within the limits of the territorial sea, but they tend to “project power” as far as they are capable from the national coasts, allegedly with the purpose of “protecting and guaranteeing the national interests and security” [3] of their states not only “on the coasts, in inland sea waters, and in territorial waters, but also in the exclusive economic zone, on the continental shelf, and the high seas of the world’s oceans.” [3] One of the “basic common criteria for gauging the capability” [10] of military navies is the “logistical and geographic reach with capacity for sustained operations”. [10] At present, there are a number of 15 military navies capable of operating relatively long periods of time on the whole planet or at least in areas situated beyond the exclusive economic zone, namely the deep regions of oceans, the so called “blue-water navies”, [10] and there are still a number of other states with the ambition of creating such military navies. Thus, for example, the military navy of the Russian Federation was qualified with the Todd & Lindberg classification system in 2015 as having the capacity of “power projection to regions adjacent to its own”, [10] but in 2001, this state had formulated as its objectives of “domestic policy” till 2020 as being “ensuring the presence of the Russian Navy in remote areas of the world’s oceans”, as well as “ensuring the regular military presence of the Russian Federation in the Indian Ocean”. [3] In this way, it is to be expected that the influence of the military navy to diminish and restrict the maritime space available for civil navigation to increase continually in the future in peacetime as well, the civil navigators will have to more and more frequently take action to avoid collision on the high seas of the Planetary Ocean.

Further, although military vessels cease to attack civil vessels in peacetime, but through the drills which they carry out in different state military maritime zones, the military navies, in a much reduced measure though, but they keep their quality of navigational hazard for the civil maritime navigation. In this way, the diminution and restriction of the maritime space available for civil navigation is committed in peacetime through military drills as well. Thus, for example, through the large-scale live-fire military drills carried out by the military navy of China at the beginning of august 2022 in six “closure zones” [11] established around Taiwan, above 200 merchant vessels were forced to resort to the modifi-

cation of the planned route, having the effect in the short term of increasing the voyage time with a few days. According to the maritime security service provider Diaplous, “it is of utmost importance that the shipping industry be prepared by exercising extreme vigilance while sailing through the Strait and the wider region, as well as by remaining informed on official directives or notices, in order for merchant vessels to not experience any security incidents that would unwittingly trigger a military escalation between the involved parties”. [11]

1.2. Visit, search or diversion

By unleashing an armed conflict, the belligerent military navies acquire the right — pursuant to the customs of international law codified in the Part V, entitled Measures Short of Attack: Interception, Visit, Search, Diversion and Capture, Section II, entitled Visit and Search of Merchant Vessels, Articles 118-124 of the San Remo Manual — pursuant to the Article 118 to visit and search merchant vessels “outside neutral waters where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that they are subject to capture,” [9] or, pursuant to the Article 119, “as an alternative to visit and search, a neutral merchant vessel may, with its consent, be diverted from its declared destination.” At the same time, pursuant to the Article 108, the belligerent military navies acquire the right of “controlling neutral vessels in the immediate vicinity of naval operations.” [9]

1.3. Capture or diversion

By unleashing an armed conflict, the belligerent military navies acquire the right — pursuant to the customs of international law codified in the Part V, Section IV, entitled Capture of Enemy Vessels and Goods, Articles 135-140 of the San Remo Manual — pursuant to the Article 135 to capture, without “prior exercise of visit and search, enemy vessels, whether merchant or otherwise, and goods on board such vessels outside neutral waters”, [9] with the exception of certain vessels of special purpose or engaged in one of the activities provided in the Article 136. Pursuant to the Article 138, the “capture of a merchant vessel is exercised by taking such vessel as prize for adjudication. As an alternative to capture, an enemy merchant vessel may be diverted from its declared destination.” [9]

The belligerent military navies may extend their right of capture, pursuant to the Article 98 on “merchant vessels believed on reasonable grounds to be breaching a blockade”; [9] pursuant to the Article 146 on “neutral merchant vessels being outside neutral waters, if they are engaged in any of the activities referred to in Article 67, or if it is determined as a result of visit and search or by other means, that they fulfill one of the conditions provided by the Article 146”. [9]

1.4. Mining

By unleashing an armed conflict, the belligerent military navies acquire the right — pursuant to the

customs of international law codified in the Part II, entitled Regions of Operations, Section I, entitled Internal Waters, Territorial Sea and Archipelagic Waters, Articles 14-22 of the San Remo Manual — pursuant to the Articles 15 and 16 to lay mines outside neutral waters, namely in the “internal waters, territorial sea, and, where applicable, archipelagic waters” [9] of their own states, in the exclusive economic zones and on the continental shelves of all the states, and on the high seas.

Pursuant to the Article 35, “if a belligerent considers it necessary to lay mines in the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf of a neutral State, the belligerent shall notify that State, and shall ensure, inter alia, that the size of the minefield and the type of mines used do not endanger artificial islands, installations and structures, nor interfere with access thereto, and shall avoid so far as practicable interference with the exploration or exploitation of the zone by the neutral State. Due regard shall also be given to the protection and preservation of the marine environment.” [9]

Pursuant to the Article 60 (a), minelaying is qualified as “belligerent act”, and laying mines by merchant vessels “renders merchant vessels military objectives”, [9] and therefore liable to attack pursuant to the Article 59.

Pursuant to the customs of international law codified in the Part IV, entitled Methods and Means of Warfare at Sea, Section I, subtitled Mines, Articles 80-92 of the San Remo Manual, “80. Mines may only be used for legitimate military purposes including the denial of sea areas to the enemy. 81. Without prejudice to the rules set out in Article 82, the parties to the conflict shall not lay mines unless effective neutralization occurs when they have become detached or control over them is otherwise lost. 82. It is forbidden to use free-floating mines unless: (a) they are directed against a military objective; and (b) they become harmless within an hour after loss of control over them. 83. The laying of armed mines or the arming of pre-laid mines must be notified unless the mines can only detonate against vessels which are military objectives. 85. Mining operations in the internal waters, territorial sea or archipelagic waters of a belligerent State should provide, when the mining is first executed, for free exit of shipping of neutral States. 86. Mining of neutral waters by a belligerent is prohibited. 87. Mining shall not have the practical effect of preventing passage between neutral waters and international waters. 88. The minelaying States shall pay due regard to the legitimate uses of the high seas by, inter alia, providing safe alternative routes for shipping of neutral States. 89. Transit passage through international straits and passage through waters subject to the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not be impeded unless safe and convenient alternative routes are provided.” [9]

Between 1940 and 1945, during the second world war, 8810 naval mines were laid by the military navy of the Third German Empire (Reich) as a barrage at the entrance of the Skagerrak Strait, between Denmark and Norway, with the aim of securing the route between the Empire and Norway by blocking the access of the enemy military navies into the Straits of Skagerrak and Kattegat. The safe passage of civil vessels was ensured with two unmined coastal lanes 10 nautical miles (NM) wide. [12]

Between 9 July and 15 August 1984, at least 17 vessels were damaged in the Red Sea by mines laid presumably by the RO/RO vessel registered in the Arab national state of Libya named Ghat, which prior to the minelaying action had been boarded by military naval officers of Libya under cover of crew change. [13] On 12 May 2019, four oil tankers off the coast of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, then on 13 June 2019, the Japanese tanker Kokuka Courageous and the Norwegian-owned Front Altair near the Strait of Hormuz were damaged by limpet mines attached presumably by the Revolutionary Guard of Iran, because of “tensions between the U.S. and Iran following President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from Tehran’s nuclear deal”. [14]

1.5. Destruction

By unleashing an armed conflict, the belligerent military navies acquire the right, pursuant to the Article 139 of the San Remo Manual, to destroy “a captured enemy merchant vessel, as an exceptional measure, when military circumstances preclude taking or sending such a vessel for adjudication as an enemy prize, only if the following criteria are met beforehand: the safety of passengers and crew is provided for, documents and papers relating to the prize are safeguarded, and if feasible, personal effects of the passengers and crew are saved.” [9]

1.6. Attack

The Article 1, Paragraph 4 of the Charter of the UNO interdicts war: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” [15] The Article 51 provides the right of self-defense: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” [15] In the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the San Remo Manual provides the right of attack, for both the initial aggressors, and the initial victims, only to the extent necessary for the exercise of the right of self-defense of all parties to the armed conflict.

Pursuant to the Article 41 of the San Remo Manual, “attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. Merchant vessels are civilian objects, unless they are military objectives in accordance with the principles and rules set forth in this document.” [9] By unleashing an armed conflict, the belligerent military navies acquire the right pursuant to the Article 59 to attack “enemy merchant vessels if they meet the definition of a military objective in Article 40,” namely to attack those enemy merchant vessels which “by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”, [9] namely, if those enemy merchant vessels, pursuant to the Article 60, “engage in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy, e.g., lay mines, sweep mines, cut undersea cables and pipelines, engage in visit and search of neutral merchant vessels or attack other merchant vessels; act as an auxiliary to an enemy’s armed forces, e.g., carry troops or replenish warships; are incorporated into or assist the enemy’s intelligence gathering system, e.g., engage in reconnaissance, early warning, surveillance, or command, control and communications missions; sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft; refuse an order to stop or actively resist visit, search or capture; are armed to an extent that they could inflict damage to a warship; this excludes light individual weapons for the defense of personnel, e.g., against pirates, and purely deflection systems such as chaff; or otherwise make an effective contribution to military action, e.g., carry military materials.” [9]

Pursuant to the Article 67 of the customs of international law codified in Part III, entitled Basic Rules and Target Discrimination, Section V, subtitled Neutral merchant vessels, Articles 67-71 of the San Remo Manual, the military navies acquire the right to attack also “merchant vessels flying the flag of neutral States”, [9] if they “are believed on reasonable grounds to be carrying contraband or breaching a blockade, and after prior warning they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop, or intentionally and clearly resist visit, search or capture; engage in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy; act as an auxiliary to an enemy’s armed forces; are incorporated into or assist the enemy’s intelligence gathering sys-

tem; sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft; or otherwise make an effective contribution to military action, e.g., carry military materials, and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first place passengers and crew in a place of safety. Unless circumstances do not permit, they are to be given a warning, so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other precautions.” [9] Pursuant to the Article 69, “the mere fact that a neutral merchant vessel is armed provides no grounds for attacking it.” [9] Further, pursuant to the Article 98, the military navies may also attack “merchant vessels believed on reasonable grounds to be breaching a blockade, and which, after prior warning, clearly resist capture.” [9]

Under the circumstances of armed conflict presented under the points 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5, the belligerent military navies represent major navigational hazards for civil maritime vessels. This state of law translated into facts contributed to the formation and development of the practice that the endangered civil maritime vessels navigate in convoy and be escorted by the own military navy, namely to formation of the defense function of the military navy. In consequence, in time of armed conflict, the military navy presents itself in a double aspect from the point of view of the civil maritime navigation of the belligerent states: the own military navy appears as a factor of ensuring the security of navigation, while the enemy military navy appears as a major navigational hazard.

The navigation in convoy culminated with the second world war, when it was practiced from the beginning till the end of the armed conflict, mostly in the Atlantic and the Arctic Oceans. Tens of civil maritime vessels associated in a convoy were defended by a task force of the own military navy and attacked by another task force of the enemy military navy in “convoy battles”. [17, 18]

In the Atlantic Ocean, there happened around 60 convoy battles between 1940 and 1944. [17] In the Arctic Ocean, there were formed 78 convoys between 1941 and 1945 with around 1400 merchant civil maritime vessels, from which there were lost 85. [18] It results that the system was efficient from the point of view of the maritime transportation.

It can be put the question, which function of the military navy was more efficient under circumstances of armed conflict, the one of defense, or the one of attack. Taking into account the fact that the war was won by the convoys states, it can be enounced that the military navy is more efficient as a means of defense. To the question, which navy is more efficient in default of armed conflict, the military navy or the civil navy, the answer is univocal: the civil navy.

Civil vessels may be attacked accidentally by military vessels or aircraft during exercises. As matters of example, on 15 october 1956, the USS Nautilus mistook a british merchant vessel for an aircraft carrier, and fired two dummy practice torpedoes at it. On 7 january 1983, the USS George Philip fired a 3-inch shell toward a mexican merchant vessel during a drill about 40 miles off San Francisco, California, and the round landed one mile behind the vessel. On 11 december 1988, during training operations about 200 miles northwest of Honolulu, Hawaii, the unarmed Harpoon missile of a U.S. F/A-18 Hornet aircraft from the USS Constellation confused a target hulk with an indian merchant ship, which was in the exercise area, and having struck it, killed one person. [7]

1.7. Restoration and enhancement of maritime security

Under the circumstances of vacuum of authority and the specific characteristics of the maritime waters, pursuant to the Article 110 of UNCLOS, the military navies acquire the right to visit on the high seas any vessel (ship) which is not on the exclusive non-commercial service of a state, if “there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy, in slave trade, in unauthorized broadcasting, it is without nationality, or though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, it is, in real-

ity, of the same nationality as the warship.” [2]

Pursuant to the Article 105 and 107, the military navies acquire the right to capture (seize) “on the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, a pirate ship, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships”. [2]

Pursuant to the Article 108, according to which “States shall co-operate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to international conventions,” the military navies may acquire the rights necessary to implement this universal obligation.

Pursuant to the Article 111, the military navies acquire the right to hot-pursuit a foreign ship, “when the competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State in the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or above the continental shelf, including safety zones around continental-shelf installations of the pursuing State, on condition that such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the contiguous zone or in the zone in which the violation was committed. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State.” [2]

It can be presumed that these provisions have the effect of enhancing the overall security of the civil navigation on the Planetary Ocean, even where they are not implemented.

In the above global international legal framework ensured by the UNCLOS, and as measures taken to manage the outbreak of international terrorism and somalian national — or rather subnational — piracy, there arose an unprecedented series of global military collaboration of national military navies, under the aegis of the Combined Maritime Forces, established in 2002 within the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) of the military navy of the USA, as an international partnership of 44 national military navies, with the counter-piracy and counter-terrorism mission of the restoration and enhancement of the maritime security of the global shipping routes in the north-western part of the Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, with its four combined task forces named and abbreviated CTF-150, CTF-151, CTF-152 and CTF-153. [19]

In this way, the combined task force CTF-150 was formed of the former Task Force 150 of the US Navy in Bahrain in 2002, and it has provided maritime-security, counter-terrorism and counter-drug-smuggling operations in the region of the Horn of Africa and at the North Arabian Sea, with the participation of more than 30 states, exclusive of China, Iran and Russia, [20] presumably as such national states cannot accept placing their military navies under politically western command generally, and US command especially; the combined task force CTF-151 was formed in Bahrain in 2009, as a measure to manage piracy escalation, and it has provided counter-piracy operations under a United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) mandate in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia, with the participation of around 20 states, exclusive of China, Iran and Russia; [21] the combined task force CTF-152 was formed in Bahrain in 2004, and it has provided security operations in the Persian Gulf, with the participation of around 7 states, exclusive of China, Iran and Russia, [22] it being worth mentioning that the military navy of the religious national state of Iran was not willing to cooperate and inter-operate with politically western military navies in the waters termed from the name of its people either; the combined task force CTF-153 was formed in Bahrain in 2022, as a measure to manage the attacks of the Houthi militants in Yemen against vessels navigating in those areas, and it has provided maritime-security and counter-smuggling operations in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden, with the participation of Egypt. [23]

At the same time, the Operation Atalanta or the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia, was established in London in 2008, as a measure to manage piracy escalation, and in cooperation

with the Operation Ocean Shield of NATO — till 2016, when it was terminated by NATO [24] — and the combined task force CTF-151, it has provided counter-piracy and counter-smuggling operations under UNSCR mandate in the region of the Horn of Africa, at the Arabian Sea and in the Western Indian Ocean, with the participation of around 38 states, inclusive of 11 non-EU member states, with Colombia, New Zealand and South-Korea as non-european states, but exclusive of China, Iran and Russia. The Headquarters of Operation ATALANTA formed in Brest, France, the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), with cooperation from industry. “The MSCHOA provides a 24-hour monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden, an interactive website enabling it to communicate the latest anti-piracy guidance to industry, as well as the vessels to register their movements through the region.” [25]

The absence of the military navies of the national-state trio China-Iran-Russia from the task forces originated from the USA and the European Union appears to have a political significance, and to reveal their different conception about maritime security, if confronting it with the joint anti-piracy military drill named “Maritime Security Belt – 2024”, held by units of those three national military navies in the Gulf of Oman between 11 and 15 march 2024 near the port of Chabahar in southern Iran. [26] In the “Indian Ocean Region” the “aim of domestic marine policy” of the Russian Empire, euphemistically and propagandistically termed at present “Russian Federation”, is “extending Russian transport and industrial fishing traffic and working jointly with other States to protect it from piracy.” [3] Therefore, by “other States” the russian national imperialists neither mean the states member of the European Union or NATO, nor the arab states of the Arabian Peninsula regularly participating in the CTF-152, but China and Iran.

In the opinion of Vice Admiral Bill Gortney — under the command of whom the CTF-151 was formed — the “efforts of coalition and international navies won’t solve the problem of piracy.” [36]

In relation to the Gulf of Guinea, another region affected by piracy, the military navy of China appears to have been restoring and enhancing the maritime security there as well, as a benignant, or rather “merciful” “power projection” of the armed forces of the state of China, a serviceable manifestation of the chinese national imperialism. Since 2017, it held several joint anti-piracy military drills with military navies of West African states. In july 2023, three chinese military vessels called at a port in Gabon, and then they visited other four ports on the coast of Gulf of Guinea. [28]

It can be presumed that the mere presence and activity of vessels and task forces of the military navy in maritime areas with reduced security, irrespective of the nature of their mission, reduce the vacuum of authority and have the effect of enhancing the overall security of the civil navigation in those maritime areas.

1.8. Demining

Pursuant to the Articles referring to demining of the customs of international law codified in the Part IV, Section I of the San Remo Manual, “84. Belligerents shall record the locations where they have laid mines. 86. Mining of neutral waters by a belligerent is prohibited. 90. After the cessation of active hostilities, parties to the conflict shall do their utmost to remove or render harmless the mines they have laid, each party removing its own mines. With regard to mines laid in the territorial seas of the enemy, each party shall notify their position and shall proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its territorial sea or otherwise render the territorial sea safe for navigation. 91. In addition to their obligations under Article 90, parties to the conflict shall endeavour to reach agreement, both

among themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, on the provision of information and technical and material assistance, including in appropriate circumstances joint operations, necessary to remove minefields or otherwise render them harmless. 92. Neutral States do not commit an act inconsistent with the laws of neutrality by clearing mines laid in violation of international law.” [9]

Pursuant to the Article 60 (a) — within an armed conflict — minesweeping is qualified as “belligerent act”, and sweeping mines by merchant vessels “renders merchant vessels military objectives”, [9] and therefore liable to attack pursuant to the Article 59.

In the Strait of Skagerrak, relative to the mine barrage of the military navy of the Third German Empire, mine countermeasures operations started immediately after the end of the war, and lasted till 1946. [12] However, the former active mined areas have remained navigational hazards up to the present, as the Sailing Directions present them, and accordingly, from time to time “fishermen still find sinkers resting on the seabed.” [12]

In the Red Sea, relative to the mining of the military navy of the state of Lybia, mine countermeasures operations started at the request of the coastal states in august 1984 with the participation of 26 vessels from six states, and till the middle of september 1984 they detected one mine. [13]

In the Persian Gulf, relative to the mining of the armed forces of the state of Iran, mine countermeasure operations were not necessary, as by virtue of their nature, the limpet mines were not laid in the sea, but attached to the hull of the vessel, and an unexploded mine was retrieved by the Revolutionary Guard of the state of Iran. [14]

In the Gulf of Finland, as part of the “Former Mine Danger Area No. 147”, [42] there were carried out mine countermeasures actions by the NATO’s Operation Open Spirit between 19 and 29 april 2021, during which 21 military vessels from 11 states detected more than 130 and countermined 49 historical ordnances. [44] Also on behalf of NATO, two minehunters from Germany arrived in the Gulf of Finland in february 2022, and “were patrolling it in the common road map of Finland, Estonia and NATO on how to protect the southern and northern coasts of the Gulf of Finland in crisis and warlike situations”. [45]

1.9. Defense

The emergence of security problems at sea means that the degree of presence of military navy is not sufficient to suppress the pirate, terrorist or other kind of attacks for ensuring a secure navigation. This default of security can also be compensated with the aid of the function of defense of the military navy, which proved to be efficient in the second world war. In this way, in a number of instances, the military navies chose to defend merchant vessels, rather than hunt pirate vessels, while in case of the Houthi parastate attacks, it can be the main solution for a more secure navigation in the waters around Yemen.

It appears that the People’s Republic of China chose to defend vessels, rather than to allow the implication of its military navy, the so-called “People’s Liberation Army Navy”, [27] in the globalist missions of maritime-security enhancing and piracy-suppressing, in order to avoid military collaboration and inter-operation with western states, as those missions “were not UN-led, close integration may have allowed partners to gather intelligence on Chinese capabilities, and integration may also have required installation of foreign software or hardware which may not have been possible or desirable for security reasons,” [27] issues that appear not to have constituted a problem with Iran, Myanmar, Russia and South Africa. In this way, since 2008 — the outbreak of somalian piracy — and up to the present,

the military navy of China has operated its own successive individual task forces every four to six months as “escort and safety-monitoring missions organizationally independent from other coalition forces” [27] in the Gulf of Aden to defend “national interests”, namely “chinese shipping”. [27] Since January 2024, the escort missions may have been extended to the Red Sea to manage the Houthi attacks against merchant vessels. [27]

The military navy of India established the Operation Sankalp in 2019, as a measure to manage the impacts of the Red Sea crisis, the Israel– Hamas war and the somalian piracy on the Indian shipping interests and trade routes, to protect the commercial fleet and maritime commerce of India, and it has provided maritime-security, counter-piracy and counter-smuggling operations in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. [34] In this way, by the end of 2023, it escorted 503 Indian-flagged merchant vessels in the Indian Ocean Region, and in 2024 over 230 merchant vessels in and around the Red Sea. [34]

1.10. Requisition

It can be presumed that under certain circumstances established in law, the requisition of civil vessels is possible in every state, and the requisitioning order is regularly implemented by the state armed forces.

In Singapore, pursuant to the Section 12 (1) (b) of the Requisition of Resources Act of 1985, “a competent authority may, if it appears to the competent authority to be necessary or expedient to do so in the defence of the country, or for the securing of the public safety or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, or for the conduct of exercises for those purposes, requisition any Singapore ship or anything on board a Singapore ship, wherever the ship may be, and may give such directions as appear to the competent authority to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisition.” [Note: Pursuant to the Section 2, “‘ship’ includes every description of vessel used in sea navigation whether propelled by oars or otherwise”, and “‘Singapore ship’ means a ship registered in Singapore”.] [29]

If the requisitioning order is issued to “an officer or soldier of the armed forces” and an “authorized officer” of the Section 5 (d), pursuant to the Section 12 (13), an officer or soldier of the armed forces “whom the requisitioning order is issued may without warrant stop and search any vessel with a view to ascertaining whether the vessel is to be requisitioned.” [Note: Pursuant to the Section 2, “vessel” includes a ship, boat, lighter and craft of every kind.] [29]

Pursuant to the Section 21 (1), “the compensation payable under this Act in respect of the requisition of any vessel is a sum equal to the amount which might reasonably be expected to be payable by a person for the use of the vessel during the period of the requisition”. Pursuant to the Section 21 (3), “no compensation is by virtue of this section payable in respect of any loss of, or damage to, any vessel arising in consequence of any disaster or war operations”. [29]

Pursuant to the Section 45 (a) “any person who fails to furnish any vessel which the person is directed to furnish pursuant to a requisitioning order, or fails to furnish any such vessel at the time and place at which the person is directed to furnish it, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding \$10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to both.” [29]

Pursuant to the Section 44 (1), any officer or soldier of the armed forces as an “authorised officer may without a warrant arrest any person who has committed an offence under this Act or any regula-

tions made under this Act.” [29]

In the USA, pursuant to the Title 46, Section 1242 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, following a Presidential proclamation of emergency, vessels which are owned by citizens of the United States may be requisitioned by the Secretary of Transportation of Department of Transportation. [31]

In Great Britain, requisitioning may be made by invoking the “royal prerogative”, which is a series of “residual powers” [30] of the British monarch, such as “command of the Armed Forces; maintenance of the Royal Navy; requisition of British ships in times of urgent national necessity; Crown’s right to claim Prize (enemy ships or goods captured at sea); where necessity requires, and powers in the event of a grave national emergency, including those to enter upon, take and destroy private property;”, [32] of which “exercise is delegated to the government by means of Orders in Council”. [30]

In case of the Falklands War, there was issued the Requisitioning of Ships Order in Council of 4 April 1982, which provided that “A Secretary of State or the Minister of Transport or the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may requisition for Her Majesty’s service any British ship and anything on board such ship wherever the ship may be.” [30] By “requisitioning”, the order meant “taking possession of the ship or thing or requiring the ship or thing to be placed at the disposal of the requisitioning authority”. [30] Compensations were granted by “maintaining the cash flow of owners whose ships were taken up”, [30] but only at the level of operation costs and without insurance. The requisitioned ships were placed under the command of the military navy of Great Britain.

The transatlantic liner Queen Elizabeth 2 was requisitioned on 3 May 1982 as it arrived from New York, and followed by the message sent to the ship and its owners: “Your vessel Queen Elizabeth 2 is requisitioned by the Secretary of State for Trade under the Requisitioning of Ships Order 1982 and you are accordingly required to place her at his disposal forthwith.” [30] Then, the ship “forthwith” proceeded to the port of Southampton for its “modification as a troop and supply ship”, [30] presumably under the command of the military navy of Great Britain.

Therefore, requisitioning implies the change of subordination of the vessel: while in peacetime it was subordinated to the owner, in wartime it will be subordinated to the purposes of war represented and followed by the military navy, namely it will become “an auxiliary vessel of the Army and Navy to supplement and serve the naval forces and to carry men and materials for war purposes.” [39]

1.11. Modification and inspection

It can be presumed that following requisition, the modification and inspection of civil vessels is possible in every state, and the modification and inspection orders are regularly issued and implemented by the military navy.

Pursuant to the Section 39 of the Requisition of Resources Act 1985 of Singapore, “(1) a competent authority may direct the owners of vessels to carry out such modifications or install any equipment to their vessels which are useful for defence or public safety purposes. (2) The competent authority must pay for the cost of any modifications or any equipment directed to be carried out or installed to a vessel pursuant to this section. (3) The owner of a vessel must not be required to make any modification or install any equipment which would render the owner’s vessel unfit for the purpose for which the vessel is being used by the owner.” [29]

Pursuant to the Section 40 “(1) The Minister may make regulations to require persons having in their possession vessels, if required to do so by such competent authority or person as may be specified in the regulations (a) to furnish to such competent authority or person as may be so specified a return con-

taining such particulars as to the vessels, as may be required by or under the regulations; and (b) to provide all reasonable facilities for enabling any such vessels in their possession to be inspected and examined, at such times as may be specified by or under those regulations, by such authority or person as may be so specified.” [29]

In case of the requisitioning of 3 May 1982 of the Queen Elizabeth 2 in Great Britain, the transatlantic liner was commissioned with two helipads, after large parts of the superstructure were sliced away, refuelling-at-sea gear for fuel and water supplies, additional communications equipment, defensive protection, e.g., against magnetic mines, 1000 new camp beds, and large quantities of stores totalling 71 tons. Other requisitioned ships were commissioned with “temporary flight decks, additional communication, navigation and cryptographic equipment, as well as defensive capability, and specifically trawlers with minesweeping gear. [30]

1.12. Angary

The San Remo Manual does not provide it any more, but it appears that — at least in the minds of a number of monarchs as historical relics — there are still some relics of customary belligerent rights to requisition, capture, use and destroy even neutral vessels in belligerent waters within the belligerent right termed “angary”. [33] Thus for example, one of the “prerogatives” [30] of the British monarch is the “Crown’s right of angary, in time of war, to appropriate the property of a neutral which is within the realm”. [32] Therefore, the belligerent right of angary can be partly considered as being a “residual” [30] extension of the San Remo rights to capture and destroy to neutral vessels.

1.13. Enhancement of search and rescue opportunities

Pursuant to the Article 98, entitled Duty to render assistance, of Part VII, entitled High Seas, Section 1, entitled General Provisions, of UNCLOS, “1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him; (c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it will call.” [2]

Pursuant to the Article 14 of Chapter III, entitled Duties and Functions of the Coast Guard, of The Coast Guard Act of 1978 of India, “(1) It shall be the duty of the Coast Guard to protect by such measures, as it thinks fit, the maritime and other national interests of India in the maritime zones of India. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), the measures referred to therein may provide for ... (b) providing protection to fishermen including assistance to them at sea while in distress; ... (f) such other matters, including measures for the safety of life and property at sea ... (3) The Coast Guard shall ... make provisions for ensuring that the Coast Guard functions in close liaison with Union agencies, institutions and authorities so as to avoid duplication of effort.” [40] In the application of the Paragraph 4, for example, the search and rescue (SAR) authority may ask the Coast

Guard to intervene in a case of distress, if one of the Coast Guard vessels is closer to the position of the accident than the SAR vessel.

In conformity with their regularly higher speed, as well as their special conditions of not being bound by time-related contract stipulations, loaded with cargo, and consuming less fuel, military and coast guard vessels are more fit for SAR operations. Their presence at sea increases the number of search and rescue opportunities and the probability of their success.

As matters of example, a military vessel of the CTF-150 rescued in december 2008 a number of persons whose boat was adrift in the Gulf of Aden; [20] military vessels of NATO in the Operation Active Endeavour rescued more than 100 persons from oil rigs and ships in distress; [39] military vessels of EU NAVFOR rescued between may 2012 and january 2013 two fisherman, 10 sailors and 68 persons adrift; [25] military vessels of the military navy of India in the Operation Sankalp rescued the crews of several ships hit by the Houthi militants with drones or missiles. [34]

2. Types of state military maritime zones

2.1. State military maritime zones of global relevance

“Maritime zones” can be defined as areas of the Planetary Ocean designated and/or utilized by humans. The “state military maritime zones” can be defined as maritime zones utilized by military navies of states.

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, a “state military maritime zone” can be defined as a “water area (or areas) used for operations of the armed forces of a state.” [33 CFR 334.2]

The Sailing Directions (Planning Guides) essentially present four types of state military maritime zones as state military navigational hazards: mined areas, submarine operating areas, firing areas, and explosive dumping areas. In addition and in exceptional circumstances, the military navies may still establish and utilize “sanitary cordon” zones, “quarantine” zones, blockade zones, maritime exclusion zones, and war zones. These types of state military maritime zones can or may be found in all the regions of the Planetary Ocean, and as such they appear to have a global relevance from the point of view of the global civil navigation.

The following Table no. 1 presents the number of states of the Planetary Ocean having reported or declared the types of state military maritime zones presented in the Sailing Directions, in which the succession of the capital letters M, S, F and E represents the succession of those four types of state military maritime zones, as they are distributed in the five oceans of the Planetary Ocean: [Note: The information presented by the Sailing Directions may not be exhaustive, as navigators are advised to “consult Notice to Mariners and the latest best scale chart for any additional danger areas”, [42] and it cannot be excluded the possibility of the existence of state military maritime zones unobserved or unreported by civil navigators and kept secret by state authorities.]

Number of states having a certain type of state military maritime zone																							
Oceans																							
North Atlantic				South Atlantic				Indian				Pacific				Arctic				Antarctic			
M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E
26	23	41	10	1	3	5	0	8	4	19	2	22	8	20	3	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	1

The following Table no. 2 presents the number of states of the Planetary Ocean:

Number of states					
Oceans					
North Atlantic	South Atlantic	Indian	Pacific	Arctic	Antarctic
88	23	36	49	5	0

The following Table no. 3 presents the ratio between the number states having a certain type of state military maritime zone and the number of states, as they are distributed in the Planetary Ocean:

Ratio of number of states having a certain type of state military maritime zone / number of states																							
Oceans																							
North Atlantic				South Atlantic				Indian				Pacific				Arctic				Antarctic			
M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E	M	S	F	E
.30	.26	.47	.11	.04	.13	.22	.00	.22	.11	.53	.06	.41	.45	.16	.06	.20	.40	.40	.00	.00	.00	.00	-

It can be seen that from the point of view of the state military navigational hazards, the most hazardous ocean for civil navigation is the North Atlantic Ocean, where the numbers of states having a certain type of state military maritime zone are by far the greatest, with the exception of the number of states having reported or declared mined areas, where the difference is only 4 in favor of the North Atlantic Ocean.

2.1.1. Mined areas

The “mined areas” can be defined as state military maritime zones utilized by armed forces of states for actions relative to mine warfare.

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, a “mined area” can be defined as a “water area (or areas) used for operations with mines for the armed forces.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the different types of “mined areas”, there have been used various word-groups: former mined area, mine danger area, former mine danger area, mine hazard area, mine risk area, mine countermeasures training area, mine countermeasures practice area, mine-laying practice area, permanent practice area, minesweeping corridor, minesweeping streaming corridor, minehunting area, mine detonation area, mine exercise area, exercise minefield, defensive mine field, minefield, residual area, [42] naval aircraft practice mining range area, [33 CFR 334.20] naval mine service-testing area, [33 CFR 334.260] drill minefield. [48]

From the point of view of the character of their limits, there can be identified mined areas with artificial limits, and with natural limits. Examples of *mined areas with natural limits* are the Gulf of Finland — for the navigation in which “the Russian authorities recommend passenger vessels navigate only during daylight hours between longitudes 25°30'E and 28°30'E, and mariners keep a sharp lookout at all times, especially during and after stormy weather, due to the possibility of floating mines” [42] — and the Black Sea — because “drifting mines may be found in its NW, W, and SW areas” [42] — as two natural maritime zones where at present everywhere and always may appear floating mines.

From the point of view of whether their limits have been established, published and known, there can be identified mined areas with defined limits, and with undefined limits. From among the above word-groups, a *mined area with undefined limits* can be termed “mine danger area”, “mine hazard area” or “mine risk area”, but these terms can also designate *mined areas with defined limits*. An example of *mined area with undefined limits* is the Black Sea, as presumably no belligerent parts intended to turn it as a whole into a mined area, and its limits can ultimately be defined by third parties only with its natural limits, as indicated by the naval mine colliding with the pier and exploding at the coast of the Black Sea in the seaside resort of Costinești, [Read approximately: kosti'neftj.] Romania, on 14 august 2023. [46] Therefore, the difference between the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea as mined areas is that the

Gulf of Finland is a part of the “Former Mine Danger Area No. 147”, [42] namely a *mined area with defined natural limits*, what is not the case with the Black Sea, which is a *mined area with undefined artificial limits*.

In the Gulf of Finland, there were laid around 145,000 mines during the three major wars there between 1914 and 1945, [43] from which only around 30,000 have been cleared, [44] on the basis of which it can be presumed that the source of the “floating mines” possibly appearing there is the around 115,000 residual naval mines being on or in the seabed. However, the possibility of a present minelaying activity of the military navy of the Russian Federation cannot be excluded, as it has the “Area No. 110” [42] as a mined area in the Gulf of Finland. As regards the possibility of the appearance of floating mines in the Black Sea, their source must have been the naval-mine warfare of the war between Russia and Ukraine started on 24 february 2022. Therefore, in the above sense and in a measure still perceived now by civil navigators, the above two natural maritime zones were militarized in general, and mined in special by the states of Finland, Russia and Ukraine.

From the point of view of the chronological relation between the establishment of a mined area and the beginning the mine exercise, there can be identified pre-established and after-established mined areas. In this way, in the waters of Great Britain it is possible to carry out “practice mine laying and mine countermeasures exercises involving the laying of mines” outside of the pre-established areas. [42]

From the point of view of the kind of temporal use of a mined area, there can be identified permanent and temporary mined areas. As a matter of example, the “permanent practice areas”, established and used in Belgium for mine countermeasures training, [42] are *permanent pre-established mined areas with defined artificial limits*, [42] active in daytime of weekdays, and passive at night and in weekend, for example.

From the point of view of whether in a mined area are used armed or non-armed mines, there can be identified offensive and defensive mined areas. As a matter of example, the “defensive mine fields” in Sweden, are *permanent active pre-established defensive mined areas with defined artificial or natural limits*. Such mined areas were laid in peacetime “usually in harbor entrances and archipelago channels, where the waters can be observed and the mines controlled from observation posts on shore. The mines are not activated and may only be detonated remotely from the observation post. Anchorage is prohibited in these areas due to the risk of damage to the mine equipment; during thunderstorms, vessels navigate in these areas at their own risk as full security cannot be guaranteed in such conditions. If a vessel must anchor in the mined area in an emergency, anchoring should be done as near to the outer limit of the area as possible in order to minimize damage to the mine gear.” [42]

From the point of view of the types of action for which a mined area is established and used, there can be identified minelaying, mineclearance, minehunting, minedetonating mined areas, and so on. As matters of example, the “minelaying practice areas”, established and used in Germany, Greece and Sweden, [42] are *minelaying mined areas with defined artificial limits*; the “mine countermeasures practice areas”, established and used in Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain [42] — and where in case of Italy “vessels should not anchor, fish, or conduct any underwater activity in this area due to the danger of unexploded ordnance” [42] — may comprise mineclearance, minehunting and minedetonating practices; the “temporary mine countermeasures training areas”, established and used in Great Britain, [42] are *temporary pre-established mine countermeasures mined areas with defined artificial limits*; while the “mine detonation areas”, established and used in Belgium and The Netherlands — in which “mine detonation exercises may be conducted”, [42] and around which vessels “will be notified on VHF (Very High Frequency) channel 16 and are strongly requested to avoid the danger area from 2 hours before until just after the detonation” [42] — are *temporary pre-established minedetonating mined areas with defined artificial limits*.

From the point of view of whether a mined area is established and used for training or action of bat-

tle, there can be identified exercise and battle mined areas. As a matter of example, the Gulf of Finland was in times of war a *permanent pre-established training mined area with defined natural limits*, while the Black Sea is a *permanent pre-established battle mined area with undefined artificial limits*, and the “former mined areas” were originally, during the second world war, *permanent pre-established battle minelaying mined areas with defined artificial limits*, while they are now *permanent pre-established passive minelaying mined areas with defined artificial limits*.

From the point of view of the kind of use, there can be identified mined areas with continuous use, with intermittent use, and disused or unused. As a matter of example, the mined areas established and used only during the second world war, demined after it, but still dangerous at present because of the possibility of existence of mines on the seabed as “residual dangers”, [42] are *disused permanent pre-established offensive battle minelaying mined areas with defined artificial limits*, as relics of *permanent pre-established offensive battle minelaying mined areas with defined artificial limits with continuous use* established and laid during the second world war. From among the above word-groups, such a *disused permanent pre-established offensive battle minelaying mined area with defined artificial limits* has been termed “former mined area” or “former mine danger area”, such as the “Former NEMEDRI Danger Areas”, [Note: “NEMEDRI” means “Northern European and Mediterranean Routing Instructions”.] established and used during the second world war in the waters of Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. [42] In such mined areas, “anchoring, fishing or fishing with bottom equipment, and possibly navigation too, as well as any form of submarine activity close to or on the sea bed, such as mooring and underwater diving, are prohibited due to mines on the sea bed.” [42] Further, the mined areas established after the second world war for current temporary use, and which are not used at a given moment, are *mined areas with defined artificial or natural limits with intermittent use* which can be activated, such as for example a “mine exercise area” established for periodic use.

As it can be seen in the Table no. 1, from the 27 states of the Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared mined areas, 26 states are of the North Atlantic Ocean. From these 26 states of the North Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared mined areas, 23 states are of Europe. This situation reflects the historical and political fact that Europe has been the region of the Atlantic Ocean with the most inter-state tensions. The following Table no. 4 presents the sub-oceanic and continental distribution of the number of states of the Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared mined areas: [42, 47]

Number of states having reported or declared mined areas				
Continents of the North Atlantic Ocean				
Europe	North America	South America	Africa	Asia
23	1	0	1	1
Continents of the South Atlantic Ocean				
South America	Africa		Antarctica	
1	0		0	

The only region in the South Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared mined areas is the waters around the Falkland Islands, administered by Great Britain, and claimed by Argentina. “Although the Falkland Islands have been declared mine-free, unexploded ordnance remaining from the 1982 conflict might still be found throughout the area. Suspicious objects should not be touched but be reported to the authorities. Minefield maps are available from the Joint Services Explosives Ordinance Disposal (JSEOD), Hill Side Camp, Stanley.” [47] This situation reflects the historical and political inter-state

tensions between Great Britain and Argentina, which culminated in 1982 with the war between these two states, and the mined areas referred to by the Sailing Directions have been relics of that war.

As regards Africa as a region of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea as an marginal sea of the Atlantic Ocean, only the state of Libya has reported or declared mined areas. [42]

As regards Asia as a region of the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea as marginal seas of the Atlantic Ocean, only Georgia has reported or declared mined areas, at the asian coast of Turkey at the Black Sea there is no reported or declared mined area. [42]

As regards the american states of the North Atlantic Ocean, only the USA has established mined areas. [48] This situation reflects the historical and political fact that the more united states of America were less threatened at their atlantic coasts than the less united states of Europe.

2.1.2. Explosive dumping areas

The “explosive dumping areas” can be defined as state military maritime zones utilized for dumping unexploded ordnances. The “state military” character of these areas may result solely from the state military origin of the ordnances.

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, an “explosive dumping area” can be defined as a “water area (or areas) in which there have been dumped unexploded ordnances originated from the armed forces.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the different types of “explosive dumping areas”, there have been used several word-groups: explosive dumping ground, mine disposal area, military restricted area, [42] ammunition dumping area, [47] munition dump site, munition find, [50] unexploded ordnance hazard area. [52]

From the point of view of whether their limits have been established, published and known, there can be identified explosive dumping areas with defined limits, and with undefined limits. As a matter of example, in the waters of Indonesia and Malaysia there are carried out explosive dumping activities without reported or declared explosive dumping areas. [47]

From the point of view of the origin of the dumped unexploded ordnances, there can be identified explosive dumping areas originated from armed conflict, and from military exercise. As a matter of example, “the U.S. Navy has advised that a survey (1974) of Isla Desecheo and adjacent waters revealed the presence of unexploded ordnance resulting from past usage as a target area.” [53] In this way, the mined areas and the firing areas in which unexploded ordnances have been dumped have become at the same time explosive dumping areas. Further, the historical *battle firing areas* in the Planetary Ocean are now *explosive dumping areas originated from armed conflict*.

From the point of view of the willingness of dumping unexploded ordnances, there can be identified intentional and unintentional explosive dumping areas. In this way, the explosive dumping areas resulted from mined areas and firing areas in which unexploded ordnances have been dumped can be unintentional, while all other types of explosive dumping areas must be intentional.

From the point of view of the subjects of dumping, there can be identified primary explosive dumping areas, resulted from the armed forces, and secondary explosive dumping areas, resulted from persons having found explosive devices, such as fishermen. As a matter of example, in the waters of France “any vessel having a suspicious device on board, in its nets, or in tow must report it, must not enter harbor without authorization of the port authority, must keep clear of other vessels and of the shore, must make all efforts to stand into one of the temporary deposit zones listed in the table and to mark the position in which the device is dumped.” [42]

From the point of view of the kind of temporal use of an explosive dumping area, there can be identified permanent and temporary explosive dumping areas. As a matter of example, the explosive dumping areas established in France are *secondary intentional temporary explosive dumping areas with defined limits*.

From the point of view of the extension of an explosive dumping area, there can be small and large explosive dumping areas. As a matter of example, the explosive dumping areas with the radius of 200 meters established in France [42] are *small secondary intentional temporary explosive dumping areas with defined limits*, while the five explosive dumping areas with the radius of 5 NM established in New Zealand [51] are *large intentional permanent explosive dumping areas with defined limits*.

From the point of view of the number of unexploded ordnances dumped, there can be identified single and group explosive dumping areas. The majority of the explosive dumping areas appear to be *group explosive dumping areas with defined limits*, but in the waters of Italy, for example, there can be found numerous *single explosive dumping areas with defined limits*, where there were detected single “explosive devices on the bottom”. [42]

From the point of view of whether an explosive dumping area is used or not at a given moment, there can be identified active or activated, and passive explosive dumping areas. As a matter of example, the “safety zone” at the Anderson Air Force Base in Tarague Basin, Guam, USA, is an *activated group small permanent primary intentional explosive dumping area with defined limits originated from military exercise*, when the U.S. Air Force is conducting explosive ordnance disposal operations in it. [33 CFR 334.1416]

In the USA, “upon receipt of a request from any agency for the disestablishment of a danger zone — namely a firing area — the District Engineer shall notify that agency of its responsibility for returning the area to a condition suitable for use by the public. The agency must either certify that it has not used the area for a purpose that requires cleanup or that it has removed all hazardous materials and munitions, before the Corps will disestablish the area. The agency will remain responsible for the enforcement of the danger zone regulations to prevent unauthorized entry into the area until the area is deemed safe for use by the public and the area is disestablished by the Corps.” [33 CFR 334.5] Namely, legally theoretically, in the USA a firing area can be considered as being a potential *unintentional explosive dumping area* only when it is operated by an “agent”, namely mainly by an organ of the armed forces.

However, there are explosive dumping areas in the USA as well, as it appears from the act of establishment of the firing range Atlantic Ocean south of entrance to Chesapeake Bay, where “anchoring, dredging, trawling and any bottom disturbing activities should be conducted with caution due to the potential of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other munitions and explosives of concern (MEC) on the bottom.” [33 CFR 334.390] At the same time, “unexploded projectiles” still exists at the atlantic coasts of the USA in the Marine Corps firing ranges at New River, North Carolina, and vicinity. [33 CFR 334.440] Further, the restricted area established in Harvey Point and adjacent waters in Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, North Carolina, USA, “is the inactive Harvey Point target range which was disestablished as a danger zone. The area will be open to public access for recreational and commercial uses, except that dredging, clamming, crabbing, seining, and anchoring of all vessels and any other activity which could result in disturbing or penetrating the bottom is prohibited.” [33 CFR 334.412]

As it can be seen in the Table no. 1, from the 11 states of the Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared explosive dumping areas, all the 11 states are of the North Atlantic Ocean. From these 11 states of the North Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared explosive dumping areas, 9 states are of Europe: Albania, Denmark, France, Italy, Latvia, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine. This situation once more reflects the historical and political fact that Europe has been the region of the Atlantic Ocean with the most inter-state tensions. The following Table no. 7 presents the sub-oceanic and continental distribution of the number of states of the Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared explosive dumping ar-

eas: [42, 47]

Number of states having reported or declared explosive dumping areas				
Continents of the North Atlantic Ocean				
Europe	North America	South America	Africa	Asia
9	1	0	0	1
Continents of the South Atlantic Ocean				
South America		Africa		Antarctica
0		0		0

No states of the South Atlantic Ocean and of Africa have reported or declared explosive dumping areas. [42, 47]

As regards Asia as a region of the Black Sea as a marginal sea of the Atlantic Ocean, only the state of Georgia has reported or declared explosive dumping areas. [42]

As regards the american states of the Atlantic Ocean, only the USA has reported or declared explosive dumping areas. [42] This situation once more reflects the historical and political fact that the more united states of America were less threatened at their atlantic coasts than the less united states of Europe.

2.1.3. Firing areas

The “firing areas” can be defined as state military maritime zones utilized by armed forces of states for actions relative to naval warfare.

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, a “firing area” is termed “danger zone” and defined as “a defined water area (or areas) used for target practice, bombing, rocket firing or other especially hazardous operations, normally for the armed forces.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the different types of “firing areas”, there have been used a number of word-groups: rifle range, firing range, aerial firing range, [33 CFR 334.200] surface firing range, [33 CFR 334.200] naval firing range, [33 CFR 334.220] naval artillery range, air force bombing range, artillery range, torpedo firing range, space defense test range, rocket firing range, [42] gunnery range, [33 CFR 334.330] practice firing range, [33 CFR 334.940] firing practice range, anti-aircraft firing practice range, strafing area, [33 CFR 334.420] restricted area, [33 CFR 334.1] practice area, practice firing area, [33 CFR 334.1450] firing practice area, military practice area, firing and practice area, firing and training area, firing and bombing area, exercise area, firing exercise area, naval exercise area, military exercise area, maritime exercise area, [33 CFR 334.620] torpedo exercise area, [42] special security area, naval security area, naval prohibited area, exercise and firing area, firing danger area, firing danger zone, military training area, operational training area, [33 CFR 334.620] target area, [33 CFR 334.200] naval aircraft bombing target area, [33 CFR 334.10] bombing and strafing target area, [33 CFR 334.620] bombing and gunnery target area, [33 CFR 334.1460] small arms training area, target practice area, fortified zone, target dropping zone, missile exercise zone, naval air exercise zone, live mine dispersal charges firing area, rocket launch zone, firing rocket area, rocket launch area, space launch hazard area, space launch restricted area. [42, 47]

From the point of view of the character of their limits, there can be identified firing areas with artificial limits, and with natural limits. Most firing areas appear to be with artificial limits, namely bounded by designed water lines, but there are also numerous firing areas “bounded by the coast”, especially those with sea-to-ground and ground-to-sea firing, such as those of types E3 and T8 in Italy. [42]

From the point of view of whether their limits have been established, published and known, there can be identified firing areas with defined limits, and with undefined limits. As a matter of example, in french waters “french naval vessels and aircraft carry out exercises off all points of the coast, but particularly in certain zones,” [42] in case of the “Atlantic coast, anywhere off the coast, but particularly in Baie de la Seine and off Ile d’Ouessant, L’Iroise, and Brest.” [42] Further, in Greece “if the limits of a pre-designated firing practice range or exercise area were to change suddenly, this information would be referred to in the announcement of firing practices or exercises.” [42]

From the point of view of whether a firing area is used or not at a given moment, there can be identified active or activated, and passive firing areas. As a matter of example, in Italy the firing area T836 is active in weekdays from 06.00 to 16.00, and passive in weekdays from 16.00 to 06.00 local time, and in weekend. [42]

From the point of view of the kind of temporal use of a firing area, there can be identified permanent and temporary firing areas. As a matter of example, in Belgium there is a “maritime exercise area, which is active year-round”, [42] namely it is permanent, and in Italy the firing area E303 is reported or declared to be active year-round, while the firing area E345 is active only “from 1 September until 7 July of the following year.” [42]

From the point of view of the liberty of access into the firing area, there can be identified firing areas with free entry, with conditionally free entry, with periodically prohibited entry, and with permanently prohibited entry. As a matter of example, in Lithuania entry into the firing areas is free, namely they “operate under a ‘clear range’ policy, and as such they are monitored by land-based naval surveillance stations in combination with vessels participating in firing exercises,” [42] and in Israel “the Area 69C is permanently closed, but a permit for daylight entry can be obtained; entry into the Area 615 is prohibited during the hours of darkness; and entry into the Area 611A is always prohibited.” [42]

From the point of view of the chronological relation between the establishment of the firing area and the beginning the firing exercise, there can be identified pre-established and after-established firing areas. In this way, in Greece “in addition to the existing pre-designated firing practice ranges and exercise areas, firing practice or exercises may be executed in other areas not predesignated, in which case an announcement will be made at least 48 hours before the start of the firing practice or exercises, describing the limits of the area, as well as the time and duration of the practice or exercises.” [42]

From the point of view of emplacement of the firing area, there can be identified firing areas within the territorial sea, and outside of the territorial sea. As a matter of example, in the waters of France the firing area D16E (Armen) is situated far beyond the territorial sea, at around 60 NM from the western coast”. [42]

From the point of view of the types of action for which a firing area is established and/or used, there can be identified firing areas for small arms training, sea-to-sea firing, sea-to-ground firing, ground-to-sea firing, sea-to-air firing, air-to-sea firing, air-to-air firing, missile firing, torpedo firing, tank firing, surface firing, anti-aircraft firing, submarine exercise, missile firing exercise, coastal battery exercise, gunnery exercise; defense exercise, rocket launch, firing practice, bombing practice, mortar firing practice, firing from shore batteries or ships at sea at fixed or floating targets, firing at remote-controlled craft, torpedo launching, anti-submarine warfare, at night, warships and aircraft may be darkened and operating without navigational lights, gunnery bombing, aerial bombing, which can be in the form of circle, polygon and sector. As a matter of example, in the waters of France “the exercises include surface firing, ground-to-air and air-to-ground firing, torpedo launchings, bombing, anti-submarine war-

fare, minesweeping operations, etc.” [42]

From the point of view of their divisibility, there can be identified homogeneous and subdivided firing areas. As a matter of example, the firing area S733 in the waters of Taranto, Italy, is subdivided in the four tetragonal zones A, B, C and D, this making it possible a partial use of the area. [42]

From the point of view of the types of armed forces which exercise in the firing area, there can be identified firing areas for coast guard units, and for army units. Regularly, the firing areas are established for the army, but there are exceptions. As a matter of example, in the waters of Italy the firing area T831 “was set aside for firing practice by Coast Guard units”. [42]

From the point of view of whether a firing area is established and used for training or action of battle, there can be identified training and battle firing areas, the latter being termed “area of armed conflict” and “area of naval operations” by the San Remo Manual. [8]

As it can be seen in the Table no. 1, from the 46 states of the Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared firing areas, 41 states are of the North Atlantic Ocean. From these 41 states of the North Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared firing areas, 24 states are of Europe. This situation further reflects the historical and political fact that Europe has been the region of the Atlantic Ocean with the most inter-state tensions. The following Table no. 6 presents the sub-oceanic and continental distribution of the number of states of the Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared firing areas: [42, 47]

Number of states having reported or declared firing areas					
Continents of the North Atlantic Ocean					
Europe	North America	Caribbean Sea	South America	Africa	Asia
24	3	6	1	4	3
Continents of the South Atlantic Ocean					
South America		Africa		Antarctica	
3		2		0	

The states of the South Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared firing areas are Brazil, French Guiana, Saint Helena/Ascension Island, South Africa and Uruguay. Brazil is divided between the North Atlantic Ocean and the South Atlantic Ocean though, its reported or declared firing areas are all situated south of the equator. South Africa is divided between the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean though, the great majority of its reported or declared firing areas are situated in the South Atlantic Ocean. [47]

As regards the african states of the Mediterranean Sea as a marginal sea of the Atlantic Ocean, only the state of Egypt has no reported or declared state military maritime zones. [42]

As regards Asia as a region of the Mediterranean Sea, Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea as marginal seas of the Atlantic Ocean, the states of Turkey, Lebanon and Israel have reported or declared firing areas. [42]

As regards the american states of the North Atlantic Ocean, Venezuela, Mexico, the USA, Canada, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Curacao, Guadeloupe and Martinique have reported or declared firing areas. [42] This situation further reflects the historical and political fact that the more united states of America were less threatened at their atlantic coasts than the less united states of Europe.

2.1.4. Submarine operating areas

The “submarine operating areas” can be defined as state military maritime zones utilized by armed forces of states for actions relative to submarine warfare, inclusive of escorting and anchoring.

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, a “submarine operating area” can be defined as a “water area (or areas) used for operations with submarines for the armed forces.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the different types of “submarine operating areas”, there have been used a number of word-groups: submarine exercise area, [42] escorted submarines sector, [33 CFR 165.732] naval submarine base, [33 CFR 334.75] naval submarine support base. [48]

The above four terms of submarine operating areas presumably designate three types of such state military maritime zones classified from the point of view of the kind of activities which a military submarine performs within those types of zones: in the “naval submarine base” and “naval submarine support base” she anchors, bunkers, takes on provisions, discharges sewage, wastewater and rubbish, is maintained etc.; in the “escorted submarines sector” she is escorted towards or from the “submarine exercise area”, where she carries out the military exercises proper.

From the point of view of their divisibility, there can be identified homogeneous and subdivided submarine operating areas. As a matter of example, the submarine operating area S701 in the waters of La Spezia, Italy, is subdivided in the two tetragonal zones A and B, this making it possible a partial use of the area. [42]

A major characteristic of the “submarine exercise areas” is that although they are regularly reported with defined limits to the Sailing Directions and charts, in fact they can be encountered in much wider areas, presumably at least partly owing to their movement necessary between the bases and the defined exercise areas, by this means further reducing the maritime space available for civil navigation. In this way, although there are 45 submarine operating areas defined in the waters of Canada, the canadian submarines may be encountered “anywhere off the Canadian coasts, particularly in the vicinity of the home port.” [42] Although there is one large submarine operating area defined in the waters of France, the french submarines may be encountered “anywhere along the French coast, particularly in the vicinity of the ports of Cherbourg, Brest, and Lorient, and in the Bay of Biscay.” [42] Further, “British submarines may be met day or night while operating in any of the waters of the British Isles, but most particularly in the vicinity of the ports of Clyde, North Channel, the Minches, Plymouth, and Barrow.” [42] And the “submarine exercise areas” marked on charts do not mean that submarines do not exercise outside the defined limits of these state military maritime zones. [42]

In the waters of the USA, the 33 CFR 165.732 created the “regulated navigation area” termed “escorted submarines sector”, which shall come into being “whenever any Navy submarine (foreign or domestic) is being escorted by the Coast Guard within the Sector Jacksonville Captain of the Port Zone territorial seas”, namely: “(1) All waters within 1 NM of any Navy submarine operating within the Sector Jacksonville Captain of the Port Zone territorial seas; and (2) All waters within 1 NM of the charted center of the navigation channel from the southern tip of Crab Island in the Cumberland Sound, Georgia, to the St. Marys Entrance Channel and its approach extending eastward to lighted buoy ‘STM’. (b) All persons and vessels located within” the above-created escorted submarines sectors “shall follow all lawful orders and/or directions given to them by designated Coast Guard representatives. (c) Notification. The Coast Guard escort will attempt, when necessary and practicable, to notify any persons or vessels inside or approaching the vicinity of the escorted submarines sector of its existence via VHF Channel 16 and/or any other means reasonably available.”

At the Atlantic coasts of the USA, there is a single “naval submarine base”, which also received the

status of “restricted area”: “Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut, 5 NM upriver from the mouth of Thames River. (1) Vessels and other watercraft within the designated navigation channel may proceed through the restricted area at normal operating speeds without stopping. Vessels and watercraft may also utilize the water area within the restricted area located between the western edge of the designated channel and the western shore for fishing, anchoring and other recreational uses. However, all persons, vessels and watercraft, except U.S. military personnel and vessels must leave the restricted area when notified by personnel of the New London Submarine Base that such use will interfere with submarine maneuvering, operations or security. (4) The regulations in this section shall be enforced by the Commander, U.S. Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut, and such agencies as he/she may designate.” [33 CFR 334.75]

As it can be seen in the Table no. 1, from the 26 states of the Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared submarine operating areas, 23 states are of the North Atlantic Ocean. From these 23 states of the North Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared submarine operating areas, 17 states are of Europe. This situation also reflects the historical and political fact that Europe has been the region of the Atlantic Ocean with the most inter-state tensions. The following Table no. 5 presents the sub-oceanic and continental distribution of the number of states of the Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared submarine operating areas: [42, 47]

Number of states having reported or declared submarine operating areas				
Continents of the North Atlantic Ocean				
Europe	North America	South America	Africa	Asia
17	3	1	1	1
Continents of the South Atlantic Ocean				
South America		Africa		Antarctica
2		1		0

The states of the South Atlantic Ocean having reported or declared submarine operating areas are Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. Brazil is divided between the North Atlantic Ocean and the South Atlantic Ocean though, its reported or declared submarine operating areas are all situated south of the equator. South Africa is divided between the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean though, its reported or declared submarine operating areas are all situated in the South Atlantic Ocean. [47]

As regards the african states of the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea as a marginal sea of the Atlantic Ocean, only the state of Libya, has reported or declared submarine operating areas, [42] while the state of Morocco intends to purchase two submarines. [49]

As regards Asia as a region of the Mediterranean Sea, Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea as marginal seas of the Atlantic Ocean, only the state of Turkey has reported or declared submarine operating areas, all of those being situated at its asian coasts. [42]

As regards the american states of the North Atlantic Ocean, Colombia, Barbados, the USA and Canada have reported, declared or established submarine operating areas. [47] This situation also reflects the historical and political fact that the more united states of America were less threatened at their atlantic coasts than the less united states of Europe.

The submarine operating areas cannot completely eliminate the risk of collision with submarines. In this way, on 20 september 1957, the Royal Navy diesel submarine HMS Taciturn collided with a merchant ship during exercises off Brighton, U.K., in the English Channel. On 10 april 1982, the West Ger-

man submarine *Pisagua* collided with a merchant ship in the Danish Straits. On 18 september 1984, a soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine collided with a soviet tanker in the Strait of Gibraltar. [7]

2.1.5. Maritime warning areas

The “warning areas” can be defined as state military maritime zones of “firing areas”, as defined under the point 2.1.3., established on the high seas.

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations and The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations of the military navy of the USA, a “warning area” can be defined as a “defined water area (or areas) on the high seas used for dangerous military activities: target practice, bombing, rocket firing or other especially hazardous operations, normally for the armed forces.” [33 CFR 334.2] [61]

On the high seas, it may happen that a unit of a military navy will engage in “dangerous military activities”, [61] such as “missile testing, gunnery exercises, space vehicle recovery operations”. [61] In that case, the commander may establish a “warning area” and announce it through a “special warning to mariners, notice to mariners, hydro-Atlantic/hydro-Pacific messages, and the global maritime distress and safety system.” [61] In pretending not to restrict the freedom of the high seas provided with the Article 87 of UNCLOS, vessels are not interdicted to enter the warning area, but if have done it, they are expected to identify themselves and make known their intentions, in order to avoid misinterpretations, otherwise they may be considered “imminent threats”, [61] particularly if they carry out “hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent, including interference with declared military activities”, [61] and as such they risk “proportionate measures in self-defense”. [61]

This kind of state military maritime zones appear to violate the UNCLOS, not so much as they restrict in a measure the exercise of freedom of the high seas, as rather as the military navies performing “dangerous military activities” and holding out the prospect of “measures in self-defense” can hardly be considered to reserve the high seas or exclusive economic zones for peaceful purposes, in the sense of the Articles 88 and 58.

2.1.6. Military cordon zones

I use the attribute “military” instead of “sanitary” because of the greater suitability of the former and the presumed propagandistic nature of the latter expounded under the point 3. The “military cordon zones” can be defined as state military maritime zones utilized by military navies of states for preventing military targets of relatively high value from being approached by vessels of a probable enemy. [1]

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, a “military cordon zone” can be defined as a “water area (or areas) with which the approach of military targets of relatively high value by vessels of a probable enemy is prevented by the navy.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the different types of “military cordon (zones)”, there have been used several word-groups, which i consider as having an intentional or unintentional military national propagandistic character: cordon sanitaire, sanitary cordon, sanitary zone, defensive bubble. [1]

From the point of view of the state of motion of the military targets of relatively high value, there can be identified static and movable military cordon zones. As a matter of example, the “cordon sanitaires”

established around aircraft carriers form *movable military cordon zones*.

From the point of view of the type of military targets of relatively high value to be protected, there can be identified “carrier, flagship, ocean surveillance vessel, submarine, ammunition vessel, and sea-based command and control platform” [58] military cordon zones. As a matter of example, a “sanitary cordon” established around a submarine underway is a *submarine movable military cordon zone*.

The necessity of establishing “military cordons” or “sanitary cordons” or “cordon sanitaires” appeared during the cold war, when soviet spy vessels used to trail US aircraft carriers, and the US military navy envisaged that those could be shaken off by the help of such zones. However, owing to the obligation of notifying the parameters of the “military cordon zones”, it was not possible keeping the movement of the aircraft carriers in complete secret. [1] Anyway, a “military cordon zone” must be useful for the self-defending military navy, as while the direct information obtained by the observation of spy vessels are relatively accurate, the indirect information obtained by calculations are estimative.

The main characteristics of a “military cordon zone” are that it is established by the head of state or delegated subordinates, in a crisis situation, when the probability of a military aggression to be suffered by the zone-enforcing military navy is relatively high, and it requires the exclusion from the “military cordon zone” of only the designated vessels, of the potentially aggressive state, while it must not affect the freedom of navigation of the military vessels of the potentially neutral states and of the civil vessels which are deemed not to represent a threat of all states. [1]

2.1.7. Selective blockade zones

I use the word-group “selective blockade” instead of the word “quarantine” because of the greater suitability of the former and the presumed propagandistic nature of the latter expounded under the point 3. The “selective blockade zones” can be defined as state military maritime zones utilized by military navies of states for blocking the access or exit of selected vessels of a probable enemy. [1]

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, a “selective blockade zone” can be defined as a “water area (or areas) used by the military navy for blocking the access or exit of selected vessels of a probable enemy.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the “selective blockade (zones)”, there have been used several word-groups, which i consider as having an intentional or unintentional military national propagandistic character: quarantine, maritime quarantine, naval quarantine, quarantine zone. [1]

The necessity of establishing a “selective blockade zone” also appeared during the cold war, when in 1962 the Soviet Union attempted to change the security system of the Americas by beginning placing offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. The government of the USA saw the single solution to prevent this in establishing and enforcing a “quarantine” on 24 october 1962, with which its military navy succeeded in hindering the soviet military vessels carrying the respective weapons to reach their port of destination, what led to a solution of the conflict. Ever since then, this type of state military maritime zone was no more established and utilized. [1]

The main characteristics of a “selective blockade zone” are its measured and selective characters, as well as its peaceful purpose of de-escalating an emerging armed conflict. [1]

Unlike a “military cordon zone”, which must be movable in the majority of cases, a “selective blockade zone” appears to be always static. [1]

As a potential utilization of the “selective blockade zone”, there can be mentioned the case of North Korea, which could be placed in the future under a selective blockade by the military navies of South

Korea, Japan and the USA, in order to prevent it from procuring the parts and materials necessary for further developing its nuclear weapons. [1]

2.1.8. Blockade zones

The “maritime blockade zones” can be defined as state military maritime zones for which all vessels are prevented from entering and/or exiting by military navies of states. [1]

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, a “maritime blockade zone” can be defined as a “water area (or areas) established for preventing all vessels from entering and/or exiting by the military navy.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the “maritime blockade (zones)”, there have been used several word-groups: naval blockade, blockaded area, blockaded zone, area subject to blockade, identification and interception zone. [1]

Unlike “selective blockade” or “quarantine”, a blockade is considered an act of war, through its unrestrained, impartial and degrading characters. [1]

According to the San Remo Manual, the blockade is a “method of warfare”, which “93. shall be declared and notified to all belligerents and neutral States. 94. The declaration shall specify the commencement, duration, location, and extent of the blockade and the period within which vessels of neutral States may leave the blockaded coastline. 95. A blockade must be effective. The question whether a blockade is effective is a question of fact. 96. The force maintaining the blockade may be stationed at a distance determined by military requirements. 97. A blockade may be enforced and maintained by a combination of legitimate methods and means of warfare provided this combination does not result in acts inconsistent with the rules set out in this document. 99. A blockade must not bar access to the ports and coasts of neutral States. 100. A blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels of all States. 101. The cessation, temporary lifting, re-establishment, extension or other alteration of a blockade must be declared and notified as in paragraphs 93 and 94.” [9]

The Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality defines “blockade” as “the interdiction of all or certain maritime traffic coming from or going to a port or coast of a belligerent”. [59] This definition includes in the sphere of the notion of “blockade” also the “selective blockade”, approached under the point 2.1.6. In its light, the notion of “quarantine” appears indeed as an “euphemism of the Kennedy Administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, designed to transmit the intentions of President Kennedy that the action was not an act of war”. [1] At this point, distinction must be made between the will of the “lawmaker” and that of the blockade declaring state, which in this particular case are not quite the same: while the San Remo Manual considers the blockade a “method of warfare”, the Kennedy Administration did not want a full scale war with the Soviet Union, but only to prevent it from building an offensive nuclear capability in Cuba.

2.1.9. Immediate area of operations

The “immediate area of operations” can be defined as state military maritime zones in which there are being conducted hostile actions or naval war operations by armed forces of states. [1]

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, an “immediate area of operation”

can be defined as a “water area (or areas) used for conducting naval war operations by the armed forces.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the “immediate area of operations”, there has still been used the word-group “immediate area of naval operations”. [1]

According to the interpretation of the military navy of the USA, relative to an “immediate area of operations” the belligerent military navy may impose any kind of restrictions, inclusive of interdiction of entry. An “immediate area of operations” is not a “free-fire zone”, [1] where a “sink-on-sight” [1] policy may be implemented, but the targeting rules provided by the law of naval warfare — for example, the Articles 39 through 45, relative to target discrimination, of the San Remo Manual — must be observed. Merchant vessels flying the flag of neutral state may acquire enemy character, if they fulfill at least one of the conditions provided by the Article 67 of the San Remo Manual, mentioned under the point 1.6. Further, an “immediate area of operations” must not “deny access to neutral nations, or close an international strait to neutral shipping, unless another route of similar convenience remains open to neutral traffic.” [1]

2.1.10. Maritime exclusion zones

The “maritime exclusion zones” can be defined as state military maritime zones established and enforced by belligerent military navies with the purpose of controlling the movement and possibly imposing qualified entry and routing conditions for certain or all categories and types of vessels. [1]

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, a “maritime exclusion zone” can be defined as a “water area (or areas) used for controlling the movement and possibly imposing qualified entry and routing conditions certain for certain or all categories and types of vessels by the armed forces of a belligerent.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the “maritime exclusion zones”, there have been used several word-groups: naval exclusion zone, maritime security zone, blockade zone, area subject to long distance blockade, area dangerous to shipping, [60] exclusion zone, total exclusion zone, military exclusion zone, operational zone, maritime operational zone, area of operations, defense zone, war zone, barred area, military area, maritime control area, maritime surveillance area, defensive sea area. [1]

The Article 108 of the San Remo Manual recognizes a “customary belligerent right to control neutral vessels and aircraft in the immediate vicinity of naval operations.” [9] This right may be exercised by establishing and enforcing “maritime exclusion zones”, “as an exceptional measure”, [9] pursuant to the Article 106 and under the conditions mentioned under the point 1.1. In ensuring the efficiency of the measures, as well as protecting neutral vessels and enemy merchant vessels, the Article 107 provides that “compliance with the measures taken by one belligerent in the zone shall not be construed as an act harmful to the opposing belligerent.” [9]

“Maritime exclusion zones” “serve the dual purpose of warning neutral platforms [Note: Military vessels.] to avoid areas of potential hostile action and of advising both neutral and enemy merchant vessels and civil aircraft entering the zone that they may be subject to boarding, inspection, diversion, capture or destruction, depending upon their status and activity.” [1]

2.2. State military maritime zones of regional relevance

The totality of the state military maritime zones of global relevance presented by the Sailing Directions is not exhaustive. Even the Sailing Directions warn about the necessity of also taking into account other sources of information for finding out additional state military maritime zones, such as notices to mariners and radio navigational warnings. These new items and types of state military maritime zones can regularly be found only in the waters of one state, and as such they appear to have a regional relevance from the point of view of the global civil navigation.

2.2.1. State military maritime zones of the USA

In the USA, state military maritime zones are established on the basis of the military legal patterns termed “danger zone”, “restricted area”, “defense area” and “naval vessel protection zone”, as well as on the basis of the neutral legal patterns termed “regulated navigational area”, “safety zone” and “security zone”, which latter ones are both civil and military, or neither civil nor military, rise above civil and military subjects, do not discriminate between them.

Pursuant to 33 CFR 165.5, entitled “Establishment procedures”, of the Subpart A, entitled “General, “(a) A safety zone, security zone, or regulated navigation area may be established on the initiative of any Coast Guard official authorized to issue such an order in accordance with 33 CFR 1.05–1.”

2.2.1.1. State military maritime zones as “regulated navigation areas”

Pursuant to 33 CFR 165.10 of the Subpart B, entitled “Regulated Navigation Areas”, “a regulated navigation area is a water area within a defined boundary for which regulations for vessels navigating within the area have been established under this part.” “The geographic application of the regulated navigation areas in this part are determined based on the statutory authority under which each is created.” [33 CFR 165.9]

“Vessel operating requirements (regulations). Each District Commander may control vessel traffic in an area which is determined to have hazardous conditions, by issuing regulations: (a) Specifying times of vessel entry, movement, or departure to, from, within, or through ports, harbors, or other waters; (b) Establishing vessel size, speed, draft limitations, and operating conditions; and (c) Restricting vessel operation, in a hazardous area or under hazardous conditions, to vessels which have particular operating characteristics or capabilities which are considered necessary for safe operation under the circumstances.” [33 CFR 165.11]

“General regulations. (a) The master of a vessel in a regulated navigation area shall operate the vessel in accordance with the regulations contained in Subpart F, entitled “Specific Regulated Navigation Areas and Limited Access Areas”. (b) No person may cause or authorize the operation of a vessel in a regulated navigation area contrary to the regulations in this part.” [33 CFR 165.13]

As a matter of example, on the basis of the above legal pattern, there was established, “in the special regulations in Subpart F of this part”, a “regulated navigation area” at the U.S. Naval Submarine Base on Ballast Point in San Diego Bay, California. [33 CFR 165.1107]

It is to be mentioned that the number of civil subjects to which the neutral legal pattern of “regulated

navigation area” was applied is overwhelmingly greater.

2.2.1.2. State military maritime zones as “safety zones”

Pursuant to 33 CFR 165.20 of the Subpart C, entitled “Safety Zones”, “a safety zone is a water area, shore area, or water and shore area to which, for safety or environmental purposes, access is limited to authorized persons, vehicles, or vessels. It may be stationary and described by fixed limits or it may be described as a zone around a vessel in motion.” “(b) Safety zones may be established in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, including the territorial sea to a seaward limit of 12 NM from the baseline.” [33 CFR 165.9]

“Unless otherwise provided in this part: (a) No person may enter a safety zone unless authorized by the Captain of the Port or the District Commander; {Note: Captain of the Port means the U.S. Coast Guard officer as described in 33 CFR 6.01–3, commanding a Captain of the Port zone described in 33 CFR part 3, or that person’s authorized representative. [33 CFR 96.120] District Commander means the officer of the Coast Guard designated by the Commandant to command a Coast Guard District. [33 CFR 6.01–2]} (b) No person may bring or cause to be brought into a safety zone any vehicle, vessel, or object unless authorized by the Captain of the Port or the District Commander; (c) No person may remain in a safety zone or allow any vehicle, vessel, or object to remain in a safety zone unless authorized by the Captain of the Port or the District Commander; and (d) Each person in a safety zone who has notice of a lawful order or direction shall obey the order or direction of the Captain of the Port or District Commander issued to carry out the purposes of this subpart.” [33 CFR 165.23]

As a matter of example, on the basis of the above legal pattern, there was established a “safety zone” at the Coast Guard Air Station San Diego in San Diego Bay, California. [33 CFR 165.1106]

It is to be mentioned that the number of civil subjects to which the neutral legal pattern of “safety zone” was applied is overwhelmingly greater.

2.2.1.3. State military maritime zones as “security zones”

Pursuant to 33 CFR 165.30 of the Subpart D, entitled “Security Zones”, “(a) A security zone is an area of land, water, or land and water which is so designated by the Captain of the Port or District Commander for such time as is necessary to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility, to safeguard ports, harbors, territories, or waters of the United States or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States. (b) The purpose of a security zone is to safeguard from destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of a similar nature: (1) Vessels, (2) Harbors, (3) Ports, and (4) Waterfront facilities: in the United States and all territory and water, continental or insular, that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” “(c) Security zones may be established in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, including the territorial sea to a seaward limit of 12 NM from the baseline.” [33 CFR 165.9]

“Unless otherwise provided in the special regulations in Subpart F of this part: (a) No person or vessel may enter or remain in a security zone without the permission of the Captain of the Port; (b) Each person and vessel in a security zone shall obey any direction or order of the Captain of the Port; (c) The Captain of the Port may take possession and control of any vessel in the security zone; (d) The Captain of the Port may remove any person, vessel, article, or thing from a security zone; (e) No person may

board, or take or place any article or thing on board, any vessel in a security zone without the permission of the Captain of the Port; and (f) No person may take or place any article or thing upon any waterfront facility in a security zone without the permission of the Captain of the Port.” [33 CFR 165.33]

As a matter of example, on the basis of the above legal pattern, there was established the “security zone” within the Naval Station San Diego in San Diego Bay, California. [33 CFR 165.1101]

It is to be mentioned that the number of civil subjects to which the neutral legal pattern of “security zone” was applied is overwhelmingly greater.

2.2.1.4. State military maritime zones as “danger zones”

Pursuant to 33 CFR 334.2 of the Part 334, entitled “Danger Zone and Restricted Area Regulations”, “(a) danger zone [is] a defined water area (or areas) used for target practice, bombing, rocket firing or other especially hazardous operations, normally for the armed forces. The danger zones may be closed to the public on a full-time or intermittent basis, as stated in the regulations.” This type of US military maritime zone appears to be much less a pattern than the US “neutral” maritime zones “safety zone” and “security zone”, in its case there appears to be much more discretion for the particular “regulations”.

As a matter of example, by the application of the looser legal pattern of “danger zone” there was established the “naval aircraft bombing target area” in the Gulf of Maine off Seal Island, Maine, USA. Pursuant to the “regulations”, “(b) no aerial bombing practice will take place in the danger zone after 5:00 p.m. Mondays through Saturdays, at any time on Sundays, or during foggy or inclement weather. (2) Vessels or other watercraft will be allowed to enter the danger zone any time there are no aerial bombing exercises being conducted. (3) No live ammunition or explosives will be dropped in the area. (4) Suitable Notice to Mariners, by appropriate methods, will be issued by the Commander, First Coast Guard District, Boston, Massachusetts; upon request of the Commandant, First Naval District, Boston, Massachusetts, or his designated agent. (5) Prior to the conducting of each bombing practice, the area will be patrolled by a naval aircraft or surface vessel to ensure that no persons or watercraft are within the danger zone. Vessels may be requested to veer off when drops are to be made, however, drops will be made only when the area is clear. The patrol aircraft will employ the method of warning known as “buzzing” which consists of low flight by the airplane and repeated opening and closing of the throttle. (6) Any such watercraft shall, upon being so warned, immediately leave the designated area and, until the conclusion of the practice, shall remain at such distance that it will be safe from falling projectiles. (7) The regulations of this section shall be enforced by the Commandant, First Naval District, Boston, Massachusetts, or such agencies as he may designate.” [33 CFR 334.10]

It is to be mentioned that all the subjects to which the military legal pattern of “danger zone” was applied appear to be of military character.

2.2.1.5. State military maritime zones as “restricted areas”

Pursuant to 33 CFR 334.2 of the Part 334, entitled “Danger Zone and Restricted Area Regulations”, “(b) restricted area is a defined water area for the purpose of prohibiting or limiting public access to the area. Restricted areas generally provide security for Government property and/or protection to the public from the risks of damage or injury arising from the Government’s use of that area. 3 (a) The danger

zone and restricted area regulations shall provide for public access to the area to the maximum extent practicable.” This type of US military maritime zone also appears to be much less of a pattern than the US “neutral” maritime zones “safety zone” and “security zone”, in its case there appears to be much more discretion for the particular “regulations”.

As a matter of example, by the application of the looser legal pattern of “danger zone” there was established the “Naval Base and Naval Surface Weapon Center” in the Chesapeake Bay off Fort Monroe, Virginia, USA. Pursuant to the “regulations”, “(b) (1) Anchoring, trawling, fishing and dragging are prohibited in the restricted area, and no object, either attached to a vessel or otherwise, shall be placed on or near the bottom unless authorized by the Facility Manager, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Coastal Systems Station Detachment, Fort Monroe, Virginia. (2) This section shall be enforced by the Commander, Naval Base, Norfolk.” [33 CFR 334.360]

It is to be mentioned that all the subjects to which the military legal pattern of “restricted area” was applied also appear to be of military character.

2.2.1.6. Defense areas

The part 761 of the Subchapter F, entitled “Islands under Navy Jurisdiction” of the Code of Federal Regulations, “provides regulations governing the entry of ships into [32 CFR 761.1] defense areas, namely naval defensive sea areas, naval airspace reservations, and naval administrative areas.” [32 CFR 761.5]

“Background and general policy. (a) Certain areas, due to their strategic nature or for purposes of defense, have been subjected to restrictions regarding the free entry of ships. Free entry into the areas listed and defined in this part, and military installations contiguous to or within the boundaries of defense areas, is subject to control as provided for by Executive order or other regulation. The object of controls over entry into naval defensive sea areas, naval airspace reservations, [naval] administrative areas, is to provide for the protection of military installations as well as other facilities, including the personnel, property, and equipment assigned to or located therein. Ships are excluded unless and until they qualify for admission under the applicable Executive order or regulation. (b) The control of entry into or movement within defense areas by ships will be exercised so as to fully protect the physical security of, and insure the full effectiveness of, bases, stations, facilities and other installations within or contiguous to defense areas. However, unnecessary interference with the free movement of ships is to be avoided.” [32 CFR 761.2]

As matters of example, by the application of the policy of “defense area”, “by Executive orders the President has reserved, set aside, and established in the Atlantic Area the Guantanamo Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area and the Guantanamo Bay Naval Airspace Reservation, as well as he has reserved, set aside, and placed under the control and jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Navy for administrative purposes the Naval Administrative Area Johnston Island, including its appurtenant reefs and territorial waters.” [32 CFR 761.3]

By “territorial waters” the lawmaker means “that part of the sea included within the envelope of all arcs of circles having a radius of three marine miles with centers on the low water line of the coast. For the purpose of this definition, the term ‘coast’ includes the coasts of islands, islets, rocks, atolls, reefs and other areas of land permanently above the high water mark.” [32 CFR 761.5 (i) (2)]

Pursuant to 32 CFR 761.6 of the Subpart B, entitled “Criteria and Basic Controls”, “(a) (1) Entry authorizations may be issued only after an Entry Control Commander, or a duly authorized subordinate acting in his behalf, has determined that the presence of the ship will not, under existing or reasonably

foreseeable future conditions, endanger, place an undue burden upon, or otherwise jeopardize the efficiency, capability, or effectiveness of any military installation located within or contiguous to a defense area. Factors to be considered shall include, but not be limited to, the true purpose of the entry, the personal history, character and present or past associates of the individuals involved, the possible burdens or threats to the defense facilities which the presence of the ship or the individuals involved impose or might reasonably be expected to impose on the related base complex.”

It is to be mentioned that all the subjects to which the military policy of “defense area” was applied also appear to be of military character.

2.2.1.7. Naval vessel protection zones

Pursuant to 33 CFR 165.2015 of the Subpart G, entitled “Protection of Naval Vessels”, a “naval vessel protection zone is a 500-yard regulated area of water surrounding large U.S. naval vessels that is necessary to provide for the safety or security of these U.S. naval vessels.” “Naval vessel protection zones may be established in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, including the territorial sea to a seaward limit of 12 nautical miles from the baseline.” [33 CFR 165.9] This type of US military maritime zone does not appear to be a pattern, but a pure US state military maritime zone.

Pursuant to 33 CFR 165.2025, “(b) A naval vessel protection zone exists around U.S. naval vessels greater than 100 feet in length overall at all times in the navigable waters of the United States, whether the large U.S. naval vessel is underway, anchored, moored, or within a floating dry dock, except when the large naval vessel is moored or anchored within a restricted area or within a naval defensive sea area.”

It is to be mentioned that all the subjects to which the military legal pattern of “naval vessel protection zone” was applied also appear to be of military character, since “U.S. naval vessel means any vessel owned, operated, chartered, or leased by the U.S. Navy; any pre-commissioned vessel under construction for the U.S. Navy, once launched into the water; and any vessel under the operational control of the U.S. Navy or a Combatant Command.” [33 CFR 165.2015]

2.2.2. State military maritime zones of Australia

In the light of the Defence Act 1903 of Australia, a vessel navigating in any portion of the waters around Australia relative to which it has sovereignty or sovereign rights may at any time find itself in a state military maritime zone, if in the judgement of the competent authorities there is a threat to the interests of the state in that portion of those waters, for the management of which the utilization of the armed forces is necessary.

2.2.2.1. Offshore area

Pursuant to the Section 51, entitled “Interpretation”, of the Division 1, entitled “Calling out and directing utilisation of Defence Force”, of the Part IIIAAA, entitled “Utilisation of Defence Force to pro-

protect Commonwealth interests and States and self-governing Territories”, of the Defence Act 1903 of Australia, “(1) Australian offshore area means: (a) Australian waters; or (b) the exclusive economic zone of Australia; or (c) the sea over the continental shelf of Australia; or (d) an area prescribed by the regulations; and includes the airspace over an area covered by paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d).” “Australian waters” means the territorial sea and the sea on the landward side of the baseline of Australia.

Pursuant to the Section 51AA, entitled “Order about utilising Defence Force in the offshore area to protect Commonwealth interests”, “if the authorising Ministers are satisfied that: (a) there is a threat in the Australian offshore area to Commonwealth interests (whether in that area or elsewhere); and (b) the Defence Force should be called out and the Chief of the Defence Force should be directed to utilise the Defence Force in the Australian offshore area to protect the Commonwealth interests against the threat; (2) the Governor-General may, by written order, call out the Defence Force and direct the Chief of the Defence Force to utilise the Defence Force in the Australian offshore area to protect the Commonwealth interests against the threat concerned.”

Pursuant to the Section 51SC, entitled “International obligations”, of the Subdivision A, entitled “Preliminary”, of the Division 3A, entitled “Powers in the Australian offshore area etc.”, “the authorising Ministers or an authorising Minister must, in giving an authorisation or making a declaration under this Division, have regard to Australia’s international obligations.”

Pursuant to the Section 51SD, entitled “Definitions”, “In this Division: *Facility* includes a fixed or floating structure or installation of any kind. *Vessel* means: (a) a ship, boat, raft, pontoon or submersible craft; or (b) any other thing capable of carrying persons or goods through or on water; and includes a hovercraft (or other non-displacement craft) and a floating structure or installation.”

Pursuant to the Section 51D, entitled “Chief of Defence Force to utilise Defence Force as directed”, “if the Governor-General makes an order under section 51AA, the Chief of the Defence Force must utilise the Defence Force, in such manner as is reasonable and necessary in the Australian offshore area, for the purpose of protecting the Commonwealth interests specified in the order against the threat concerned.”

Pursuant to the Section 51SE, entitled “Special powers of members of the Defence Force”, of the Subdivision B, entitled “Special powers of members of the Defence Force”, “a member of the Defence Force who is being utilised in accordance with section 51D may, under the command of the Chief of the Defence Force, do any one or more of the following: (a) take any one or more of the following actions: (i) take measures (including the use of force) against a vessel or aircraft, up to and including destroying the vessel or aircraft; (ii) give an order relating to the taking of such measures; (iii) capture a vessel or aircraft; (iv) board a facility, vessel or aircraft; (v) recapture a facility, vessel or aircraft; (vi) prevent, or put an end to, acts of violence; (vii) protect persons from acts of violence; (b) in connection with taking any such action, do any one or more of the following: (i) free any hostage from a facility, vessel or aircraft; (ii) if the member finds a person whom the member believes on reasonable grounds to have committed an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory, detain the person for the purpose of placing the person in the custody of a member of a police force at the earliest practicable time; (iii) control the movement of persons or vessels; (iv) evacuate persons to a place of safety; (v) search persons, facilities, vessels or aircraft for dangerous things or other things related to the threat concerned; (vi) seize any dangerous thing or other thing related to the threat concerned found in such a search; (c) do anything incidental to anything in paragraph (a) or (b).”

2.2.2.2. Offshore general security area

Pursuant to the Section 51SF, entitled “Declaration of offshore general security area”, of the Subdivision C, entitled “Powers that may be exercised anywhere in an offshore area”, “(1) the authorising Ministers may, in writing, declare that a specified area is an offshore general security area in relation to members of the Defence Force who are being utilised in accordance with section 51D. (2) The area may be specified by reference to an area surrounding one or more vessels or aircraft, or surrounding a class of vessels or aircraft, being an area the boundaries of which change as the location of the vessels or aircraft changes; (3) If the authorising Ministers make a declaration under subsection (1), they must arrange for a statement that: (a) summarises the content of the order under section 51AA; and (b) states that the declaration has been made; and (c) describes the offshore general security area and its boundaries; to be: (d) notified to persons in the offshore general security area to the extent that this is practicable; and (e) published in the Gazette. (4) However, subsection (3) does not apply if the authorising Ministers declare, in writing, that they are satisfied that the application of subsection (3) would prejudice the exercise of powers under Subdivision B by members of the Defence Force who are being utilised in accordance with section 51D. (6) A failure to comply with subsection (3) does not make the declaration ineffective to any extent.”

Pursuant to the Section 51SG, entitled “Authorisation to search facilities in the offshore general security area for dangerous and other things”, “(1) if, while the Defence Force is being utilised in accordance with section 51D: (a) the Chief of the Defence Force; or (b) an officer of the Defence Force, or an officer of the Defence Force included in a class of officers, authorised by the Chief of the Defence Force for the purposes of this section; believes on reasonable grounds that: (c) there is a dangerous thing on a facility in the offshore general security area and it is necessary as a matter of urgency to make the dangerous thing safe or prevent it from being used; or (d) there is another thing on a facility in the offshore general security area that is related to the threat concerned and it is necessary as a matter of urgency to seize the thing; he or she may give an authorisation under this section. (2) The authorisation must: (a) authorise entry to, and search of, the facility; and (b) describe the facility; and (c) state the name, rank and service number of a member of the Defence Force (the offshore member in charge) who is to be in charge of the search; and (d) authorise the member in charge, and any other member of the Defence Force assisting the member, (the offshore search members) to carry out the search; and (e) authorise each offshore search member to seize any thing found on the facility in the course of the search that he or she believes on reasonable grounds to be a dangerous thing or a thing that is related to the threat concerned; and (f) state that, if any offshore search member believes on reasonable grounds that a person who is on or near the facility while the search is being carried out has a dangerous thing or a thing that is related to the threat concerned in his or her possession, the member is authorised to: (i) search the person; and (ii) seize any dangerous thing or other thing related to the threat concerned found in the search.”

Pursuant to the Section 51SJ, entitled “Search of vessel or aircraft in the offshore general security area for dangerous or other things”, “(1) if a member of the Defence Force who is being utilised in accordance with section 51D believes on reasonable grounds that a dangerous thing, or another thing that is related to the threat concerned, is in or on a vessel or aircraft in the offshore general security area, the member may: (a) erect barriers or other structures for the purpose of stopping the vessel or aircraft; and (b) whether or not the member does so: (i) stop and detain the vessel or aircraft; and (ii) search the vessel or aircraft, and any thing found in or on the vessel or aircraft, for the dangerous thing or other thing that is related to the threat concerned; and (iii) seize any dangerous thing or other thing that is related to the threat concerned that the member finds in the search. (2) If the member stops the vessel or aircraft, the member must not detain it for longer than is reasonable and necessary to search it and any thing

found in or on it. (3) The master of the vessel, or the captain of the aircraft, is entitled to observe the search being carried out. (4) The entitlement to observe the search being carried out ceases if the master or captain impedes the search.”

Pursuant to the Section 51SK, entitled “Search of persons in the offshore general security area for dangerous and other things”, “if a member of the Defence Force who is being utilised in accordance with section 51D believes on reasonable grounds that a person in the offshore general security area has a dangerous thing, or a thing that is related to the threat concerned, in the person’s possession, the member may: (a) search the person for such a thing; and (b) seize any such thing found in the search.”

2.2.2.3. Offshore designated area

Pursuant to the Section 51SL, entitled “Declaration of offshore designated area”, of the Subdivision D, entitled “Powers that may be exercised only in relation to an offshore designated area in the offshore general security area”, “(1) the authorising Ministers may, in writing, declare that a specified area, being the whole or a part of an offshore general security area, is an offshore designated area in relation to members of the Defence Force who are being utilised in accordance with section 51D. (2) The area may be specified by reference to an area surrounding one or more vessels or aircraft, or surrounding a class of vessels or aircraft, being an area the boundaries of which change as the location of the vessels or aircraft changes; (3) To avoid doubt, if the whole or part of the area later ceases to be within an offshore general security area, the whole or the part ceases to be an offshore designated area. (4) If the authorising Ministers make a declaration under subsection (1), they must arrange for a statement that: (a) states that the declaration has been made; and (b) describes the offshore designated area and its boundaries; to be notified to persons in the offshore designated area to the extent that this is practicable. (5) However, subsection (4) does not apply if the authorising Ministers declare, in writing, that they are satisfied that the application of subsection (4) would prejudice the exercise of powers under Subdivision B by members of the Defence Force who are being utilised in accordance with section 51D.”

Pursuant to the Section 51SM, entitled “Control of movement in relation to an offshore designated area in the offshore general security area”, “(1) a member of the Defence Force who is being utilised in accordance with section 51D may do any one or more of the following in relation to a person who is in charge of a vessel or aircraft: (a) if the vessel or aircraft is in a part of the offshore general security area that is outside an offshore designated area, direct the person not to bring the vessel or aircraft into the offshore designated area; (b) direct the person to take the vessel or aircraft out of an offshore designated area; (c) direct the person to take the vessel or aircraft from a place in an offshore designated area to another place in the offshore designated area; (d) direct the person not to take the vessel or aircraft from a place in an offshore designated area to any other place, or to a specified place, in the offshore designated area; (e) compel the person to comply with a direction under any of the above paragraphs. (2) A member of the Defence Force may erect barriers or other structures at the boundary of, or in, an offshore designated area for the purpose of stopping persons from bringing a vessel or aircraft into the offshore designated area or to a place in the offshore designated area. (3) If there is no person in charge of a vessel or aircraft that is in an offshore designated area, a member of the Defence Force may do such things as are reasonable and necessary for either of the following purposes: (a) to take the vessel or aircraft to a place in the offshore general security area that is outside the offshore designated area; (b) to take the vessel or aircraft to another place in the offshore designated area. (4) A member of the Defence Force may do any one or more of the following in relation to a person (whether or not in charge of a vessel or aircraft): (a) if the person is in the offshore general security area but outside an

offshore designated area, direct the person not to enter the offshore designated area; (b) direct the person to leave an offshore designated area; (c) direct the person to move from a place in an offshore designated area to another place in the offshore designated area; (d) compel the person to comply with a direction under any of the above paragraphs. (5) The power of a member under paragraph (1)(a) or (4) (a) to direct a person: (a) not to bring a vessel or aircraft into an offshore designated area; or (b) not to enter an offshore designated area; includes: (c) the power to direct a person not to do either of those things unless the person agrees to a member searching: (i) in either case, the person; and (ii) in a paragraph (a) case, the vessel or aircraft and any thing on the vessel or aircraft; for dangerous things or other things related to the threat concerned; and (d) if the person agrees, the power to conduct such a search and to seize any such thing that the member finds in the search. (6) A member of the Defence Force may board any vessel or aircraft for the purpose of giving a direction under any provision of this section.”

Pursuant to the Section 51SP, entitled “Power to require person to operate facility, vessel or aircraft or machinery or equipment”, “(1) a member of the Defence Force who is being utilised in accordance with section 51D may, in connection with the exercise of any power under this Division, require a person to operate a facility, vessel or aircraft, or machinery or equipment on a facility, vessel or aircraft, in a particular manner. (2) However, the member may do so only if the member believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the purpose of preserving the life or safety of other persons or to protect Commonwealth interests against the threat concerned. (3) A person commits an offence if: (a) the person is required to operate a facility, vessel or aircraft, or machinery or equipment on a facility, vessel or aircraft, in a particular manner under this section; and (b) the person fails to comply with the requirement.”

2.2.3. Coastal security zones

The “coastal security zones” can be defined as state military maritime zones established by coastal states with the effect of enhancing their security and limiting military expansion of other states.

In the terminology of the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA, a “coastal security zone” can be defined as a “water area (or areas) used for enhancing the security of a coastal state and limiting military expansion of other states by a coastal and continental-shelf expansion of the armed forces of the coastal state.” [33 CFR 334.2]

For terming the “coastal security zones”, there have been used a number of word-groups: military zone, military security zone, military boundary, [1] declared security zone, and declared defense zone. [61]

In spite of the fact that the Article 25 of the UNCLOS conditions the establishment of temporary state military maritime zones in the territorial sea on their being “essential for the protection of the security” [2] of the coastal state, that the Article 56, entitled “Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone”, does not provide the right to perform military activities in the exclusive economic zone in peacetime, as well as presumably in the enforcement of the Article 58, entitled “Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone”, which also does not provide the right of other states to perform military activities in the exclusive economic zone in peacetime, there are states which have established permanent state military maritime zones overlapping or coinciding with the exclusive economic zone, “in which they purport to regulate the activities of warships and military aircraft of other States by restrictions such as prior notification or authorization for entry, limits

on the number of foreign ships or aircraft present at any given time, prohibitions on various operational activities, or complete exclusion.” [61]

As a matter of example, on 1 august 1977, “demanded by the situation prevailing in the country, the Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army established the military boundary to reliably safeguard the economic sea zone of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and firmly defend militarily the national interests and sovereignty of the country.” [55] The state military maritime zone termed “military boundary” has extended up to 50 NM from the claimed straight baseline of the territorial sea on the east, and coincided with the exclusive economic zone on the west. Military vessels have been prohibited from entering, while civil vessels have been permitted to enter only on the basis of agreement or approval. [55] With this, it violated the Article 56 of UNCLOS, which does not provide the coastal state the right for military exploitation of the exclusive economic zone.

The USA has not recognized this state military maritime zone, and “protested claims by public statement in 1977 and diplomatic protest in 1990, and conducted operational assertions (overflight) in 1988.” [54] In the “Protest from the United States of America” of 1990 to the UNO, “the Government wished to recall that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea did not recognize the right of coastal States to assert powers or rights for security purposes in peacetime which would restrict the exercise of the high seas freedom of navigation beyond the territorial sea. The military boundary was not promulgated until 1977, and therefore the armistice agreement [of 1953] cannot be deemed to justify the security zones.” [56]

The establishment of some “coastal security zones” can be presumed to have been exaggerated reactions to the maximalist interpretations of the concepts of “freedom of navigation”, [10] meaning by it “freedom of military exercise” as well, and of “peaceful purpose”, [10] attributing it to military exercises as well. From this point of view, certain “coastal security zones” can be considered legitimate if their regulations are based on minimalist interpretations of the rights of other states in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone of the coastal state, and as such they have the effect of counterbalancing the maximalist character of the interpretations of the above-mentioned concepts.

3. Specific aspects of civil navigation in state military maritime zones

3.1. Civil port navigation

“Civil port navigation” can be defined as navigation between the mooring berth and the point where the pilot disembarks a merchant vessel, and in the opposite direction. On this portion of route, a civil vessel may need to transit or avoid “naval vessel protection zones” and other types of state military maritime zones established on the basis of the following neutral legal patterns: “regulated navigation area”, “safety zone” and “security zone”, primarily considered in their american senses treated under the point 2.2.1, and ultimately in their potential more general senses in which they might be generalized.

As a matter of a partially imaginary example, [Note: The example disregards charted information.] a vessel planning to depart from the Port of San Diego, and to transit “naval vessel protection zones”, the “specific regulated navigation area” mentioned under the point 2.2.1.1, the specific “safety zone” mentioned under the point 2.2.1.2, and the specific “security zone” mentioned under the point 2.2.1.3, has to follow with attention the notices on VHF-FM channel 16 for information relative to movements of all large U.S. naval vessels, as well as the Broadcast Notices to Mariners and the Local Notices to Mariners of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) for information relative to the dates and times of the submarine docking/undocking operations at the U.S. Naval Submarine Base on Ballast Point.

If during transiting the “specific regulated navigation area” at the U.S. Naval Submarine Base on Ballast Point, there is a submarine docking/undocking operation, it shall proceed at a speed that generates no wake from the vessel, and shall comply with any other orders or directions issued by the Coast Guard as required for the safety of the submarine docking/undocking operation. [33 CFR 165.1107]

During transiting the specific “safety zone” at the Coast Guard Air Station San Diego, it shall avoid anchoring, stopping, remaining within the zone, and approaching within 100 yards (92 meters) of the land area of Coast Guard Air Station or structures attached thereto. [33 CFR 165.1106]

For transiting the specific “security zone” within the Naval Station San Diego, an authorization has to be obtained from the Captain of the Port San Diego, the Commander of the Naval Base San Diego, the Commander of the Naval Region Southwest, or the Commanding Officer of the Naval Station San Diego. During transiting the security zone on the basis of a permission, it shall observe the instructions of the Captain of the Port San Diego or his or her designated representative. [33 CFR 165.1101]

During transiting a “naval vessel protection zone”, it shall operate at the minimum speed necessary to maintain a safe course, unless required to maintain speed by the Navigation Rules, which shall apply at all times; it shall proceed as directed by the Coast Guard, the senior naval officer present in command, or the official patrol; it shall maintain a distance of at least 100 yards of a large U.S. naval vessel, unless authorized otherwise; prior to transiting a navigable channel or waterway it shall ask for permission to pass within 100 yards of a moored or anchored large U.S. naval vessel, if necessary.” [33 CFR 165.2025]

3.2. Coastal and continental-shelf civil navigation

“Coastal and continental-shelf navigation” can be defined as navigation from the point where the pilot disembarks a merchant vessel as far as the normal visibility distance of the coasts and above the continental shelf. On this portion of route, a civil vessel may need to transit or avoid the following types of state military maritime zones: “mined areas”, “explosive dumping areas”, “firing areas” and “submarine operating areas”, primarily considered in their US senses treated under the point 2.2.1, and ultimately in their potential more general senses in which they might be generalized.

3.2.1. Coastal and continental-shelf civil navigation in mined areas

The Sailing Directions contain an extensive database of mined areas, which therefore must be taken into account on voyage planning. However, the possibility of the appearance of additional mined areas always exists, information about which may appear in the notices to mariners and the latest best scale charts. [42]

The safest navigational measure relative to mined areas is avoiding them. Regularly, the passive mined areas do not constitute risks for surface navigation. Owing to the possibility of the presence of residual mines on the sea-bottom, it is dangerous and prohibited anchoring, fishing, diving and other subsurface activities. There are mined areas in which also navigation is prohibited, such as ones in Romania. Single mines located on the sea-bottom near the coast, should be avoided at a distance of not less than 0.5 NM in the waters around Crotona, Italy, or shall be avoided at a distance of not less than 1 NM in the Black-Sea waters of Romania. The probability of detonating bottom magnetic mines is directly proportional to the vessel’s magnetic field — for example, bulkers with cargo of iron ore have a relatively increased magnetic field — and inversely proportional to the under-keel clearance. [42]

On the mined areas, mineclearance or minehunting operations may be carried out. Vessels engaged in such mine operations exhibit three balls in daytime, and three all-round green lights at night, in a horizontal line, with the central ball or light raised above the lateral ones, indicating the danger of their approach to less than 1000 meters. [63] However, in the coastal waters of France they can be approached to not less than 0.3 NM at the sides, and 0.5 NM at the stern. [42]

The state military maritime zone in the Gulf of Maine off Cape Small, Maine, USA, termed “naval aircraft practice mining range area”, [33 CFR 334.20] is used for “test drops from aircraft made at intermittent periods from noon until sunset local time and only during periods of good visibility. Testing will not restrict any fishing, recreational, or commercial activities in the testing area. Aircraft will patrol the area prior to and during test periods to insure that no surface vessels are within the area. No test drops will be made while surface vessels are transiting the area. No live ammunition or explosives will be dropped in the area.” [33 CFR 334.20]

The above provisions of law are unobjectionable from the point of view of the civil navigator and the UNCLOS, they are a legal-theoretical manifestation on the part of the state of its intention of no military interference with the civil navigation, however there can be a nonconformity between the will of the state and the acts of the air-crew members responsible for the implementation of these provisions of law, and accordingly the possibility of inattention, negligence or even ill-will of the implementing persons cannot be excluded, which means that a vessel having entered this “naval aircraft practice mining range area” might be hit by a mine dropped from aircraft, and avoiding this decrease of security level of the vessel requires avoiding the state military maritime zone itself.

What remain objectionable in such cases of “clear range” are the military exercises themselves and the policy of state to allow them.

3.2.2. Coastal and continental-shelf civil navigation in explosive dumping areas

There is a certain resemblance between explosive dumping areas and mined areas in that any mined area having unexploded mines on the bottom can be considered a particular type of explosive dumping area, and any explosive dumping area having unexploded mines on the bottom can be considered a particular type of mined area. Accordingly, civil navigation in explosive dumping areas is rather similar to civil navigation in mined areas.

The Sailing Directions contain an extensive database of explosive dumping areas, which therefore must be taken into account on voyage planning. The safest navigational measure relative to explosive dumping areas is avoiding them. Regularly, the explosive dumping areas do not constitute risks for surface navigation. Owing to the presence of residual explosive devices on the sea-bottom, it is dangerous and prohibited anchoring, fishing, diving and other subsurface activities. Single ordnances located on the sea-bottom near the coasts of Italy, should be avoided at a distance of not less than from 100 to 500 meters. [42]

The state military maritime zone at the Anderson Air Force Base in Tarague Basin, Guam, USA, has the status of “safety zone”, and therefore it applies to it the general regulations governing safety zones mentioned under the point 2.2.1.2. It is used by the U.S. Air Force for conducting explosive ordnance disposal operations. A vessel planning to transit that “explosive dumping area” [42] has to follow with attention whether an orange range flag is hoisted in a defined position, flag which after daylight hours is illuminated, a sign indicating that explosive ordnance disposal operations are going on. At such times, entry into and transit through the zone is prohibited, unless authorized by the Captain of the Port or a designated representative thereof. This safety zone may be enforced by any Coast Guard commissioned, warrant, or petty officer, and any other representative of the Captain of the Port permitted by law. Vessels or persons violating this rule are subject to the penalties set forth by regulations. [33 CFR 334.1416]

Hoisting a flag, and allowing the respective state authorities to enforce the respective provisions of law, cannot guarantee that all concerned vessels will observe the flag, know its meaning, and respect the respective provision of law. Therefore, once the state has instituted the armed forces, and its aerial forces have begun disposing explosive ordnance, no law and no enforcing state organ can completely guarantee the security of the civil vessels navigating in the vicinity of the “explosive dumping area”.

There are also explosive dumping areas in which navigation is permanently prohibited, such as the one at Torre Lao (Scalea) in the Gulf of Policastro in Italy. Navigation in a circular area with the radius of 300 meters is permanently prohibited. When there are explosive clearance operations, the retrieved explosive devices are carried to another location with military vessels, which can be approached to not less than 500 meters. The circular area where they are destroyed has the radius of 1 NM, and all other activities are prohibited in it during the destroying operations. [42]

The above explosive dumping area in the waters of Italy is marked with two red buoys placed in its center. In the waters of Poland, explosive dumping areas and mined areas are marked with white conical buoys with a large red letter “A”. [42]

3.2.3. Coastal and continental-shelf civil navigation in firing areas

The Sailing Directions contain an extensive database of firing areas, which therefore must be taken into account on voyage planning. However, the possibility of sudden changes of limits of the pre-established firing areas and the appearance of additional, after-established firing areas exist, at least in Greece, information about which may appear in the “announcement of firing practices or exercises”. [42]

The safest navigational measure relative to firing areas is avoiding them. In a number of cases, avoidance of firing areas is compulsory, in the rest of cases it is recommended with increased caution. Owing to the possibility of the presence of residual ordnances on the sea-bottom of some firing areas, it is dangerous and possibly prohibited anchoring, fishing, diving and other subsurface activities. [42]

A number of firing areas are marked with navigational aids such as buoys, lights, as well as with lighted or unlighted beacons. [42] In the waters of Poland, state military maritime zones may be marked by buoys stamped with the letters “SN” meaning “You should stop immediately. [Do not scuttle. Do not lower boats. Do not use the wireless.] If you disobey I shall open fire on you.” [64]

A vessel planning to transit a firing area has to follow with attention the notices to mariners, navigational warnings, radio broadcasts, port authority orders, local newspapers, and other information receivable on VHF radio channels, web sites, and by telephone. [42]

For obtaining current information, a vessel transiting firing areas should maintain a listening watch on the respective VHF channel, and follow with attention the warning signals displayed from signal masts, signal stations, buoys, beacons, lightships, or patrol vessels, which in most cases are or comprise square red flags in daytime, and all-round red lights in nighttime, signals which are all different from and cannot be confused with the signals provided by the Colreg. The absence of such signals does not necessarily mean the absence of military exercises. In nighttime, exercising military vessels may not display any lights. [42]

There are firing areas which extend far beyond the territorial seas. As matters of example, in the waters of Great Britain defense exercises “take place within approximately 40 miles of the English coast,” [42] in the waters of Italy and Russia there are firing areas lying outside the territorial seas, and in the waters of France the rocket firing range between the Gironde and Cap Breton extends as far as 45 NM offshore. [42]

As a matter of example, the state military maritime zone in the Chesapeake Bay south of Tangier Island, Virginia, USA, termed “naval firing range”, [33 CFR 334.220] has the status of “danger zone”, and is used for “day and night firing conducted intermittently by one or more vessels, depending on weather and operating schedules. Any vessel propelled by mechanical means or by sail at a speed greater than five knots may proceed through the danger zone to and from points without, but not from one point to another point within the area, except when especially notified to the contrary. All vessels, other than naval craft, are forbidden to anchor within the danger zone except in cases of great emergency. All vessels anchoring under circumstances of great emergency within the area shall leave the area immediately after the emergency ceases or upon notification by the enforcing agency. When firing is in progress, adequate patrol by naval craft will be conducted to prevent vessels from entering or remaining within the danger zone. This section shall be enforced by the Commandant, Fifth Naval District, U. S. Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia, and such agencies as he may designate.” [33 CFR 334.220]

It is characteristic that the firings conducted in the “naval firing range” in the Chesapeake Bay appear not to be published in notices to mariners or similar media, but information about them can be obtained only from the military vessels designated for patrolling the spot, what depends on how “adequate” their patrol is, and vessels availing themselves of the right of passage through the “naval firing range” not

having observed military vessels will be inclined to think that there is no firing there, which might not be the case. Therefore, in case of this state military maritime zone, a complete guarantee for a vessel not to enter it during firing can be obtained only from planning avoiding it, one more reason for avoiding state military maritime zones already from voyage planning.

As a matter of another example, the state military maritime zone at the Naval Inshore Operations Training Center, Vallejo, Mare Island in the San Pablo Bay, California, USA, termed “gunnery range”, [33 CFR 334.1170] has the status of “danger zone”, and is used for “gunnery practice during the period April 1 through September 30, between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. on the first Wednesday of each month and the third full weekend (Saturday and Sunday) of June. The public will be notified prior to each firing by a Notice to Mariners issued by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the area will be patrolled by boat and searched by radar to insure a clear range. No persons or vessels shall enter or remain in the danger zone during the above stated periods except those persons and vessels connected with the gunnery practice operations. All firing will be from the southerly portion of the danger zone in a northerly direction, and only during good visibility. A safety officer will always be aboard the firing boat to guarantee that all safety precautions are observed. The regulations in this section will be enforced by the Commandant, 12th Naval District and such agencies as he may designate.” [33 CFR 334.1170]

What remain objectionable in such cases of “clear range” are the military exercises themselves and the policy of state to allow them.

3.2.4. Coastal and continental-shelf civil navigation in submarine operating areas

The Sailing Directions contain an extensive database of submarine operating areas, which therefore must be taken into account on voyage planning. [42]

The safest navigational measure relative to submarine operating areas is avoiding them. However, submarines do not always respect the established and published limits of their operating areas, the reason why their complete avoidance is practically impossible. In this way, the submarines of Canada “may be encountered anywhere off the coasts” of Canada; the submarines of France “may be encountered at any point off the coasts” of France, and the submarines of Great Britain “may be met day or night while operating in any of the waters of the British Isles”, particularly in the vicinity of their home ports. [42]

A vessel planning to transit a submarine operating area has to follow with attention the notices to mariners, navigational warnings, radio broadcasts. [42]

Submarines may operate surfaced or subsurfaced, independently or with surface vessels and/or aircraft. It can be presumed that the vessels escorting subsurfaced submarines do not and cannot respect the Colreg, as they must not abandon their mission, what increases the probability of an accident of navigation. Therefore, in any crossing situation, the vessels escorting subsurfaced submarines must be avoided with a large alteration of course, large enough to be readily apparent to the escorting vessel observing visually or by radar. [63]

Vessels escorting submarines regularly display the general signal code “NE 2” meaning “You should proceed with great caution; submarines are exercising in this area”, [64] or a red flag in case of the submarines of the state of Sweden. [42]

For detecting the presence and position of submarines operating at periscope depth, lookouts have to search for periscopes, snorkels, snorts, parabolic radar antennas, or DF loops, of which detection is certainly much difficult than that of vessels. Submarines operating at periscope depth may display an all-

round quick flashing red or yellow light which indicates their presence and position to exercising aircraft. [42]

In order to indicate its presence and position, a submarine operating under the periscope depth or surfacing may release yellow and green pyrotechnic flares, two successive white or yellow smoke candles, a flare (smoke and flame producing floats), a searchlight, an emergency signal buoy, which has a fixed white light and can be lighted by the submarine in good time while it is still submerged, a towed floating object (float or buoy) painted red and white, red and yellow, or white and orange, or air bubbles. The light displays should not be confused with distress or lifesaving signals. [42]

With the purpose of not being mistaken for relatively small vessels in nighttime, in addition to the navigation lights provided by the Colreg, the submarines operating on the surface may also display special identification lights, which in most cases are all-round very quick flashing amber lights, but may also be orange, blue or yellow in color, mounted above or below the masthead light, along with an additional continuous all-round blue light in the military service of Germany, and three continuous all-round blue lights displayed vertically in the military service of Poland. The avoidance of surfaced submarines is recommended to be made astern of them at a distance of not less than 1500 meters. Vessels exercising in connection with submarines may not display any light. [42]

The submarine operating areas appear to extend the farthest off the coasts and into the ocean from among all the state military maritime zones presented by the Sailing Directions, which is presumably related with that the submarines operated subsurfaced need deeper waters for the same safety level than the surface vessels of similar size. In this way, the submarines of Spain may conduct exercises outside the territorial sea, the submarines of Malta may put off from the coasts as far as 20 NM, and the operating exercises of the submarines of Great Britain “take place within approximately 40 miles of the English coast.” [42]

3.3. Oceanic civil navigation

“Oceanic navigation” can be defined as navigation seawards beyond the normal visibility distance of the coasts and the continental margin. On this portion of route, a civil vessel may need to transit or avoid the following types of state military maritime zones: “security zones”, “submarine operating areas”, and “warning areas”, primarily considered in their US senses, and ultimately in their potential more general senses in which they might be generalized.

The safest navigational measure relative to the types of state military maritime zones established on the high seas is avoiding them, even if for creating an appearance of complying with the UNCLOS, the establishing military authorities do not prohibit entering them.

The state military maritime zone in the Sector Honolulu Captain of the Port Zone, Hawaii, USA, termed “security zone” or “escorted U.S. Navy submarine”, is defined as “all waters, from the surface to the ocean floor, within 1,000 yards of any U.S. Navy submarine that is operating in the Sector Honolulu Captain of the Port Zone, and that is being escorted by the U.S. Coast Guard.” [33 CFR 165.1412] “The boundaries of Sector Honolulu Captain of the Port Zone comprise the State of Hawaii, including all the islands and atolls of the Hawaiian chain and the adjacent waters of the exclusive economic zone, and other nine islands and their adjacent waters of the exclusive economic zone.” [33 CFR 3.70–10] “No person or vessel may enter or remain in the security zone, unless authorized by the Coast Guard patrol commander, who may be contacted via VHF Channel 16 or other means reasonably available. The Coast Guard security escort will attempt, when necessary and practicable, to notify any per-

sons or vessels inside or in the vicinity of the security zone of the zone's existence via VHF Channel 16 or other means reasonably available." [33 CFR 165.1412]

In the first place — beyond the fact that the Senate of the USA has not ratified the UNCLOS [54] — establishing state military maritime zones in the exclusive economic zone appears to break the Article 89 of UNCLOS, entitled "Invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas", pursuant to which "no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty," [2] in conjunction with the Article 58, entitled "Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone", pursuant to which Article 89 applies to the exclusive economic zone as well. [2]

In the second place, on the basis of the above provisions of law, it can be presumed that the submarines may navigate not only in the exclusive economic zone, but also on the high seas, on the basis of the freedom of navigation provided by the Articles 58 and 87 of UNCLOS. And indeed: a soviet submarine with missiles and nuclear-armed torpedoes was found on 11 april 1968 around 750 miles northwest of the island of Oahu, Hawaii, in a water around 5000 meters deep; the submarine USS Scorpion with two nuclear-armed torpedoes was found on 27 may 1968 in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, around 400 miles southwest of the Azores; a soviet submarine with ballistic missiles was found on 6 october 1986 around 600 miles northeast of Bermuda in a water around 5500 meters deep; etc. [7]

However, the submarines regularly not only navigate in the exclusive economic zones and the high seas, but also conduct exercises, which appears to break the Articles 88 and 58, as the military exercises — and even the mere navigation of a craft designed, constructed and prepared to be used for destruction and killing — cannot be considered to have peaceful purposes. In this way, on 31 december 1961, near the coast of England, a soviet ballistic-missile submarine was returning from a training exercise; on 10 november 1966, around 350 miles east of Morehead City, North Carolina, the submarine USS Nautilus was making underway replenishment exercises with the military vessel USS Essex; etc. [7]

If submarines are considered to need a "security zone" comprising the entire column of water around them with the radius of 1000 yards when they are being escorted in the exclusive economic zone, then there is no reason to consider the opposite when they are being surfaced on the high seas unescorted. A "security zone" around a surfaced submarine on the high seas is illegal though, but it must still exist as a fact, so much the more as a civil vessel having detected it around the middle of the ocean must avoid it at a safety distance which is regularly much larger than 1000 yards, and even in a manner contrary to the Colreg. In consequence, when submarines are exercising on the high seas, they must additionally need a kind of "submarine operating area", which can be a "warning area" of the kind defined under the point 2.1.5, inherently restricting the freedom of navigation of the Article 87, and may be considered not as peaceful as required by the Article 88 of UNCLOS.

Further, the high seas appear to be the desired maritime space of also the displacement military vessels of those "nations" which appear not to have been satisfied with the areas of sea water ensured them by their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones adjudicated them with the UNCLOS. In this way, on 3 march 1975, the military vessels USS Iwo Jima and USS Nashville were conducting a highline transfer operation around 1000 NM southwest of the Azores; on 16 march 1983, the military vessels USS Antrim and USS Flatley were underway around 900 NM northwest of Hawaii to an exercise to be conducted in the western part of the Pacific Ocean; on 17 november 1983, the soviet frigate Razyaschy was found in the Arabian Sea; on 2 april 1984, the soviet aircraft carrier Minsk was found in the South China Sea; on 12 february 1988, the military vessels USS Yorktown and USS Caron were bumped by a soviet destroyer and respectively frigate at around 9 NM from the coast of the Crimean Peninsula in the Black Sea.

The displacement military vessels are also conducting exercises on the high seas, which must be preceded by the establishment of illegal or legally questionable "warning areas". In this way, on 2 june 1969, the military vessel USS Frank E. Evans was participating in the SEATO exercise "Sea Spirit"

around 650 miles southwest of Manila; on 9 June 1976, the military vessels USS Wabash and USS Flint were conducting towing exercises about 900 nautical miles northwest of Hawaii underway to a deployment in the western part of the Pacific Ocean.

4. Elements of military national propaganda

In seeking a term to designate the state military maritime zone necessary to shake off the spy vessels following aircraft carriers — described under the point 2.1.5. — there was taken over the word-group “sanitary cordon” from the field of medicine, in spite of the fact that the planned cordon had not a sanitary, but a military purpose. At the same time, in seeking a term to designate the state military maritime zone necessary to block the access to Cuba of the soviet vessels carrying offensive nuclear missiles — described under the point 2.1.6. — there was taken over the word “quarantine” from the field of medicine, in spite of the fact that the planned blockade had not a sanitary, but a military purpose. On the basis of these, it can be presumed that the purpose of these acts was to avoid the term “military”, and respectively “blockade”, to attribute a civil appearance to military measures.

Further, the medical terms “sanitary cordon” and “quarantine” can be presumed to metaphorically reflect the conflicts among the ethnical and the national secret political organizations glowing under the surface — which in peacetime are relatively concealed, but in wartime break out — based on the mentality of each of them that its state, culture and civilization are the only healthy ones, the best, and as such universal solutions offered for all the other states, cultures and civilizations, which are all ill, and the vessels of the military navies of which are the infectious agents of their illnesses, threatening with spreading them and becoming universal.

As a matter of example, the russian national secret political organization has feared that the spreading illness of NATO will reach its state, culture and civilization, the reason why it has striven to establish and enforce a “sanitary cordon” zone over the whole of Ukraine meant to prevent it from getting ill with the illness of NATO. On the part of the great majority of the other european national states, they have feared that the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation of 24 february 2022 can lead to the getting ill of their states, cultures and civilizations with the illness of the russian state, culture and civilization spread with the infectious agents what the armed forces of the russian national imperialism are.

If it could be difficult to term a cordon of military vessels as “military cordon” or “naval cordon”, and it was rather termed “sanitary cordon”, and if it could be difficult to term a line of military vessels as “selective blockade”, and it was rather termed “quarantine”, and if it could be difficult to term a bomb with tear-gas as “tear-gas bomb”, and it was rather termed “Niagara pineapple”, and if it could be difficult to term a rocket equipped with a warhead as “ballistic missile”, and it was rather termed “Oreshnik” meaning “hazel nut”, [58] as well as if all these nicknamed and even petted items have ultimately been political means of states, even ferocious political-military weapons capable of annihilating governments and parliaments of states in a few hours, about which they contrastingly concocted the concoction of being innocent, useful, and even pleasurable civil things, then it can be presumed that the national secret political organizations have strongly been interested in increasing the popularity and social acceptance of their invaluable political means, which their ever evolving armies and more and more destructive and killing weapons have been.

Certain military texts appear to ostentatiously avoid designating military objects with military terms, presumably striving to dulcify them by utilizing for their designation the “sanctified” word of “nation”, albeit military vessels can in no way be regarded as “nations”: “warning areas [that] may be established by *nations*; *nations* conducting the interception; [1] there are numerous accidents between unfriendly *nations*”, [7] by so doing presenting acts of “individual commanders” [1] as acts motivated, justified by and resulted from enforcing the interests of the “nation”. However, when it comes to violations of law and responsibilities, the same body of texts promptly shifts from the “nation” to the individual human: “Individual commanders remain liable under the law of naval warfare for violations committed within such a declared exclusion zone, just as they would for similar actions undertaken outside such a zone.”

[1]

Further, in a presumed striving of blurring the separation line between civil and military objects, the meaning of the civil term “platform” appears to have been extended to military vehicles: “such tests are often a signal for intelligence *platforms* of other nations to proceed to the area for surveillance purposes; the hostile intent of *platforms* encroaching the zone; certain *platforms* engaged in specified activity (e.g. submerged submarines) are presumed to be hostile.” [1]

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Other books

Till april 2025, i have succeeded in creating and publishing my following books:

- 1) the english-language text-image electronic version, as well as the hungarian-language text paper-back version of my book entitled “Towards the Iron Curtain of the Hungarian Communist State — my first illegal fleeing attempt from the romanian communist state”, with the internet distributor Google Play, and respectively in Romania;
- 2) the english-language text-image electronic version of my book entitled “It Is Difficult to Come out of Romania with Benefit”, with the internet distributors Google Play and Internet Archive;
- 3) the english-language text-image electronic version of my book entitled “A Case of Securitate Dossier Burial in Romania”, with the internet distributors Google Play and Internet Archive;
- 4) the english-language text electronic version of my book entitled “Statue of Captivity”, with the internet distributors Google Play and Internet Archive;
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Publication-creation information

The author created this book in more than two months, beginning with 27 november 2024, but mainly between february and 26 april 2025, as originator, researcher, writer and editor, in the english language, under private-life circumstances, containing his second book revealing ethnical and national secret political aspects and connexions of the maritime industry, resulting from the universal social need for restricting the harmful background activity of the ethnical and the national secret political organizations by asserting political globalism. The electronic redaction of the book was made by the author personally mainly with the following technical means: Lenovo IdeaPad 3, Linux-GNU MX-21, LibreOffice 7, GIMP 2.

Author information



The photo, taken on 25 june 2017 at 16.12 hours on the south-southeastern coast of the North Sea of the Atlantic Ocean of the Planetary Ocean of Planet Terra, pictures the author, István ADORJÁN, [Read approximately: 'iʃtva:n 'ɔdorja:n.] born on 20 december 1959 in the village Mikháza [Read approximately: 'mikha:zɔ. In the romanian language: Călugăreni.] in the county Maros [Read approximately: 'mɔroʃ. In the romanian language: Mureș.] in Romania, his citizenship is romanian, his ethnicity hungarian, his identity first of all human, at present he regards not one state his own or his country, ideologically he is atheist, politically liberal, his theory-like conviction is that the great religions and the national states are concoctions and means of the national secret political organizations, with his writings his purpose is the publication and diffusion of his views of scientific, philosophic-atheist, progressive, humanist, non-nationalist and liberal spirituality, particularly the revelation, publication and diffusion of his views relative to the national-imperialist, anti-humanist, anti-progressive and anti-scientific nature and activity of the national secret political organizations, great religions and national states.

**The End
of the Electronic Book**